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i.e., iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies. We show that rational-
ity and common assumption of rationality (RCAR) in complete lexicographic type
structures implies IA, and that there exist such structures in which RCAR can be
satisﬁed. Our result is unexpected in light of a negative result in Brandenburger,
Friedenberg, and Keisler (2008) (BFK) that shows the impossibility of RCAR in com-
pletecontinuousstructures. WealsoshowthateverycompletestructurewithRCAR
has the same types and beliefs as some complete continuous structure. This en-
ables us to reconcile and interpret the difference between our results and BFK’s.
Finally,weextendBFK’sframeworktoobtainasinglestructurethatcontainsacom-
plete structure with an RCAR state for every game. This gives a game-independent
epistemic condition for IA.
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Analysis of games typically begins under the premise that all players are rational. Fur-
thermore, it is often supposed, at least implicitly, that the rationality of the players is
common knowledge in the sense of Lewis (1969) and Aumann (1976)—that is, all play-
ers know it, all players know that all players know it, and so on. It is then natural to ask
which strategic choices are consistent with common knowledge of rationality (CKR).
Bernheim (1984) and Pearce (1984) gave an inﬂuential response to this question in
whichtheyarguedthattheirnotionofrationalizability exactlycapturestheimplications
of CKR on behavior. The rationalizable set is essentially the iteratively undominated
(IU) set—that is, the set of strategy proﬁles surviving iterated elimination of strongly
dominated strategies—with the added virtue of being deﬁned in a way that more starkly
emphasizes its intuitive connections to CKR.1
Bernheim (1984) and Pearce (1984) motivated their analysis as an extension of Sav-
age’s (1954) Bayesian decision theory, in which rational actors maximize subjective ex-
pected utility (SEU) subject to probabilistic beliefs about the states of the world. There-
fore,intheseandsubsequentpapers,CKRisoftenusedinterchangeablywithrationality
and common belief of rationality (RCBR), an analogous concept that is better suited for
use in Bayesian settings.2
More formal analyses followed in Brandenburger and Dekel (1987a) and Tan and
Werlang (1988), who showed that RCBR is an epistemic condition that characterizes the
IU set. In other words, RCBR implies that IU strategies are played and every IU strategy
can be played in some state where RCBR holds. A key fact underpinning this relation-
shipisthatSEUmaximizationcharacterizesavoidanceofstronglydominatedstrategies.
However, it is prima facie reasonable that rationality should incorporate an admissibil-
ity requirement—that is, avoidance of weakly dominated strategies. A long tradition in
statistical decision theory, going as far back as Wald (1939), has advocated admissibility
as a minimal criterion of rationality.3
1When we refer to rationalizability in this paper, we will mean correlated rationalizability, which omits
the independence assumptions of the original deﬁnition. The correlated rationalizable set is exactly the
IU set.
2An event is commonly believed if all players are certain of it, all players are certain that all players are
certain of it, and so on, where certainty is understood to mean belief with probability 1. In the literature,
common belief is also called common certainty, common belief with probability 1, and common 1-belief.
See Brandenburger and Dekel (1987b); Monderer and Samet (1989).
3Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) justify the requirement from a staunchly objectivist point of
view on probability while prefacing the development of their theory of two-person zero-sum games. Fur-
1In light of the preceding facts, it was intuitively appealing to conjecture that iter-
atively admissible (IA) strategies—that is, strategies surviving iterated elimination of
weakly dominated strategies—could be characterized by RCBR if rationality incorpo-
rates admissibility.4 However, Samuelson (1992) demonstrated that such a conjecture
would have signiﬁcant obstacles associated with the limitations of SEU theory. Admis-
sibility is typically obtained by requiring that players consider all states of the world to
be probabilistically possible. However, a player who believes that her opponents are ra-
tionalwouldexcludetheirinadmissiblestrategiesfromconsideration. Elegantexamples
inSamuelson(1992)illustratedthefrustratingfactthat, inmanygames, aninadmissible
strategy may maximize her SEU under such beliefs.
Brandenburger, Friedenberg, and Keisler (2008) (BFK) solved this puzzle by adopt-
ing a model of Bayesian rationality that permits the expression of a more general set
of beliefs than the set allowed by SEU theory. They deﬁned the notions of a lexico-
graphic type structure and of assuming an event, which is immune to the aforemen-
tioned shortcomings of probability 1 belief that were pointed out by Samuelson (1992).
In that framework, BFK formulated a condition, rationality and common assumption of
rationality (RCAR),thatgivesintuitivesupportfortheIAsetasasolutionconcept. Given
that an admissibility requirement partially reﬂects the view that rational players should
rule out nothing, it is reasonable to consider the consequences of RCAR in model envi-
ronments, such as complete lexicographic type structures, which, by virtue of describ-
ing sufﬁciently rich state spaces, do not presume much knowledge on the players’ part
about what BFK called “prior history or context”. BFK showed that this restriction is a
meaningful one by proving that RCAR in many incomplete type structures yields predic-
tions outside the IA set.
In this paper we address two crucial issues that were left unresolved by BFK.
First, BFK left open the question of whether there is a complete type structure in
which RCAR is possible. More broadly speaking, this ﬁrst question can be subsumed
under the question of whether “RCAR in complete type structures” is an epistemic con-
ditionforIA. Thatis, ifwelookacrossallcompletetypestructures, isthesetofstrategies
thermore, later surveys by Arrow (1951) and Luce and Raiffa (1957) are uniform in their rejection of inad-
missible decision rules.
4It is well-known that the order of eliminating weakly dominated strategies matters, whereas the order
does not matter when eliminating strongly dominated strategies. When we refer to IA strategies in this
paper, we will mean the strategies obtained by simultaneously deleting every weakly dominated strategy
of every player in each round.
2played under RCAR exactly the IA set? We answer this question in the afﬁrmative with
our Theorems 3.2 and 3.4.
Thesecondissuecanbeparaphrasedasoneof“gameindependence”. Whilethecon-
dition above—RCAR in complete type structures—is ﬁne from the perspective a game
theorist who looks across all complete type structures, it is not fully satisfactory from
the perspective of a player who considers possible only those states of the world that
are described by her type structure. It is therefore both natural and important to ask if
there is a single “context-free” model environment (e.g., a complete type structure) in
which an epistemic condition for IA (e.g., RCAR) can be satisﬁed for all games. We re-
solve this issue by showing that enough complete type structures can be embedded in a
single larger model environment such that a natural generalization of RCAR is an epis-
temic condition for IA across all games. A complete type structure in which common
assumption of rationality, as deﬁned with respect to a given game, is possible can then
be intuitively interpreted as the set of states in which there is common knowlege of that
game.
The results in this paper were unexpected in the light of an impossibility theorem
in BFK that left a decidedly negative message. BFK showed that, in type structures that
are both complete and continuous, no state of the world can satisfy RCAR. The issues
leading to this nonexistence result are independent of those that were raised in Samuel-
son (1992). This result appeared to cast doubt on the existence of any complete type
structure in which the RCAR set is nonempty. However, our results here show that RCAR
is possible when the requirement that the type structure is continuous is dropped. In
the process, we also identify some of the conceptual issues that help us to reconcile the
positive results herein with the negative conclusions of BFK.
Toward that end, we prove that, given each (discontinuous) type structure, there ex-
ists a continuous type structure with the same type sets that describes the exact same
sets of beliefs. Where the two type structures, despite being equivalent in the sense that
they have the same types and beliefs, differ is in how they classify what beliefs assume a
givenevent. Givenabeliefinadiscontinuoustypestructure,thesamebeliefinanequiv-
alent continuous type structure will, in general, assume fewer events. One implication
ofthisdifferenceisthatbeliefsinthecontinuoustypestructuremustmeetahigherstan-
dard in order to “rule out nothing”. We argue that the discussion of these differences can
be conveniently subsumed under the umbrella of topological distinguishability.5
5We caution the reader that, despite the similarity in nomenclature, these issues are completely unre-
3Additionally,wegiveatopologicalcharacterizationofanRCARtower,whichisafam-
ily of ﬁnite-order rationality sets—that is, the sets in which there is rationality and m-th
order assumption of rationality (RmAR)—in complete type structures with RCAR.
The proofs in this paper illustrate the virtues of two key mathematical results in con-
structingtypestructureswithdesirableproperties: theBorelIsomorphismTheoremand
Tarski’s celebrated theorem that every relation that is ﬁrst order deﬁnable in the ﬁeld of
real numbers is semi-algebraic. We anticipate that these methods will prove useful in
showing various existence results in other settings.








where Sa,Sb are strategy spaces and ¼a,¼b are payoff functions. The indices a and b
stand for Ann and Bob, respectively. Whenever we state a deﬁnition or result involving a
and/or b (Ann and/or Bob), it will be understood that we also make the analogous state-
ment with a and b reversed.
2.1 ADMISSIBILITY
Ann’s strategy sa 2 Sa is admissible (i.e., not weakly dominated) in the game G if and
only if sa is optimal under some full-support probability measure deﬁned over Sb. Let
Sa
1 denote the set of Ann’s admissible strategies. Given nonempty subsets X µ Sa and
Y µ Sb, let G(X,Y ) denote the reduced game
­
X,Y,¼a,¼b®
. We can then inductively
deﬁne Ann’s m-admissible strategy set Sa
m as follows: To get the induction started we
write Sa
0 ´ Sa. For each m 2 N, let Sa
mÅ1 be the set of Ann’s admissible strategies in the
reduced game G(Sa
m,Sb
m). In other words, Sa
mÅ1 is the set of Ann’s strategies that are









m. The set Sa
1£Sb
1 is called





M for some M 2N, and hence the IA set is nonempty.
lated to those raised by the extensive literature on strategic topology.
42.2 LEXICOGRAPHIC PROBABILITY SYSTEMS
Recall that a Polishspace is a separable topological space that is completely metrizable.
Let ­ denote the space of uncertainty faced by the decision maker (e.g., Ann). For now,
let us assume only that ­ is Polish and ﬁx a compatible metric. In the conventional
Bayesian theory of choice under uncertainty, a decision maker’s beliefs are represented
by a Borel probability measure on ­. The set of all Borel probability measures on ­ is
denoted by M(­).
BFK adopted the convention that a decision maker’s beliefs are represented by lex-
icographic probability systems (henceforth LPS’s), which are generalizations of proba-
bility measures. The decision theoretic foundations of LPS’s was developed in Blume,
Brandenburger, and Dekel (1991a). An LPS on ­ is any ﬁnite sequence of probability
measures on ­, e.g.,
¾Æ(¹0,...,¹n¡1)2
n times z }| {
M(­)£¢¢¢£M(­),
that satisﬁes mutual singularity—that is, there exist disjoint Borel sets U0,...,Un¡1 in











We deﬁne a Polish topology on N(­) by following the usual conventions. First, we
give M(­) its weak* topology, which makes it a Polish space. Second, we give Nn(­) Æ
Qn
kÆ1M(­) the product topology. Then we may view N(­) as a countable topological
union of disjoint Polish spaces Nn(­). N(­) with this topology is again a Polish space.
An LPS ¾ Æ (¹0,...,¹n¡1) represents an ordered sequence of mutually contradictory
hypotheses. We interpret ¹0 as being inﬁnitely more likely than ¹1, which in turn is
inﬁnitely more likely than ¹2, and so on. The primary hypothesis ¹0, being more likely
than all other hypotheses, can be regarded as the prior belief. The secondary hypothesis
6ThedeﬁnitionofLPS’sinBlume,Brandenburger,andDekel(1991a)didnotrequiremutualsingularity.
The deﬁnition above is from BFK.
5¹1 can be regarded as the conditional belief in the a priori zero-probability (i.e., ¹0-null)
event that ¹0 is false. More generally, ¹j is the conditional belief in the event that all a
priori more likely hypotheses (i.e., all ¹k such that k Ç j) are false. Such an event would
be ¹k-null for all k Ç j.
LPS’sgeneralizethenotionofprobabilitymeasuresinastraightforwardmanner. Not
surprisingly, concepts deﬁned with respect to probability measures often have obvious
analogs that are deﬁned with respect to LPS’s.
The support of an n-tuple of measures ¾ 2 N(­) is the union of the supports of the





We say that ¾ has full support if Supp¾Æ­. Equivalently, ¾ has full support if, for each
openU,thereexists j Çn suchthat¹j(U)È0. Thesetofallfull-supportLPS’sisdenoted
by L Å(­). The set N Å(­) is deﬁned similarly.
Similarly, Bayesian optimization under belief ¾ is a straightforward extension of ex-
pected utility maximization. Given an act f , for each j Çn let uj be the expected utility
of choosing f with respect to ¹j. Then the vector u Æ (u0,...,un¡1) is called the lexico-
graphic expected utility (henceforth LEU) of f under ¾. The order on the hypotheses
that comprise ¾ suggests an obvious way to compare LEU vectors. Given that, for i Ç j,
¹i is inﬁnitely more likely than ¹j, it is natural to assign inﬁnitely more importance to
the expected utility of an act under ¹i than one would to its expected utility under ¹j.
We write
(v0,...,vn¡1)Æ v ÈLEX u Æ(u0,...,un¡1)
and say that v is lexicographically greater than u if there exists k Ç n such that vk È uk,
and vj Æ uj for all j Ç k. LEU maximization is simply the maximization of LEU with
respect to the lexicographic order. Throughout this paper, we use the terms LEU and
payoff interchangeably in appropriate contexts.
2.3 ASSUMPTION
The idea of certainty (i.e., belief with probability one) admits more than one obvious
analog with respect to LPS’s. If the decision maker is certain of event E µ ­ then she
considers E to be inﬁnitely more likely than its complement ­\E. BFK introduced a
new epistemic notion, called assumption, to capture this property in LPS’s. Intuitively
6speaking, a decision maker with belief ¾ Æ (¹0,...,¹n¡1) assumes an event E if she be-
lieves every part of E to be inﬁnitely more likely than its complement ­\E. Formally,
a Borel set E is assumed under ¾ at level j if the following three conditions are met (cf.
Proposition 5.1 in BFK)7
(a) ¹i(E)Æ1 for each i · j;
(b) ¹i(E)Æ0 for each i È j; and
(c) IfU is open withU \E 6Æ? then ¹i(U \E)È0 for some i Çn.
Note that, even if E is assumed under ¾, it need not be the case that ­\E is ¾-null. In
contrast, if a decision maker is certain of E then ­\E is necessarily a null event.
It is clear that if an event E is assumed under an LPS ¾Æ(¹0,...,¹n¡1) then the level
at which E is assumed is unique, is less than n, and is the greatest j such that ¹j(E)Æ1.
It is also clear that if ¹ Æ (¹0,...,¹n¡1) and º Æ (º0,...,ºn¡1) are LPS’s of the same length
n,and¹j,ºj havethesamenullsetsforeach j Çn,then¹andºassumethesameevents
ateachlevel j Çn. Verbally, theeventsthatanLPS¹assumesdependonlyonthelength
of ¹ and the null sets of the ¹j.
2.4 LEXICOGRAPHIC TYPE STRUCTURES
LPS’s and associated constructs were used in BFK to build a framework in which the
rationale for iterated admissibility can be expressed formally (i.e., in the language of set
theory).
Recall the ﬁnite game G Æ
­
Sa,Sb,¼a,¼b®
. In the context of the game G, Ann is un-
certain of what strategy Bob will choose, what Bob believes about Ann’s strategy choice,
what Bob believes about what Ann believes about Bob’s strategy choice, and so on. To
give a parsimonious description of Ann’s beliefs about the pair consisting of Bob’s strat-
egy and Bob’s beliefs while sidestepping the inherent problem of self-reference, BFK fol-
lowed the convention of implicitly representing beliefs as types.8 Ann’s type ta is an
element of a Polish space T a, called her type space. The belief that Ann’s type repre-
sents is given by a Borel map ¸a :T a !L(Sb £T b), where T b denotes Bob’s type space.
Similarly, Bob’s types are interpreted through a Borel map ¸b : T b ! L(Sa £T a). Taken






7BFK deﬁned assumption only when ¾ has full-support, but we adopt this deﬁnition for all ¾.
8An innovation due to Harsanyi (1967).
7which is called an (Sa,Sb)-based lexicographic type structure. Members of Sa £T a £
Sb £T b are called states of the world.
The type structure T is called complete if L(Sb £T b) Æ range¸a and L(Sa £T a) Æ
range¸b.9 A complete type structure contains all beliefs about beliefs.10
2.5 RATIONALITY
ThedeﬁnitionofrationalityinBFKcombinestworequirements. TheﬁrstisBayesianop-
timality, which is captured by LEU maximization. The second, which might be roughly
described as a form of agnosticism, is reﬂected in full-support beliefs. Intuitively, in
a complete type structure, a player with full-support beliefs will consider all possibili-
ties. Formally, the LEU of a strategy sa 2 Sa under the LPS ¾ Æ (¹0,...,¹n) is the vector
(¼a(sa,º0),...,¼a(sa,ºn)) of payoffs, where ºi Æ margSb ¹i, and sa is optimal under ¾ if
the LEU of sa under ¾ is maximal among all strategies in Sa. A strategy-type pair (sa,ta)
is rational if ¸a(ta) is a full-support LPS, and sa is optimal under ¸a(ta). The set of all
rational pairs (sa,ta) is denoted by Ra











m) is the set of Ann’s types in ta 2T a such that Rb
m is assumed under ¸a(ta).
If a state (sa,ta,sb,tb) 2 Ra
mÅ1 £Rb
mÅ1 then we say that it satisﬁes rationality and m-th
order assumption of rationality (henceforth RmAR).
We write Rb




m. Note that Sb £T b is trivially assumed
under every full-support LPS on Sb £T b. It is shown in BFK that each of the sets Ra
m,Rb
m













m is the set of states for which Ann is rational and assumes that Bob is i-th
order rational for each i ·m. If a state (sa,ta,sb,tb) belongs to Ra
1£Rb
1 then it satisﬁes
rationality and common assumption of rationality (henceforth RCAR). In words, each
playerisrationalandassumesthattheotherplayerism-thorderrationalforeachm 2N.
It is shown in BFK that any LPS that assumes each of a countable sequence of events
assumes their intersection. It follows that for any RCAR state, each player assumes that
9In BFK, a type structure is called complete if L Å(Sb £T b) ( range¸a and L Å(Sa £T a) ( range¸b.
This difference is immaterial with respect to both their results and ours.
10But not necessarily all hierarchies of beliefs.
8the other player is rational at order 1, that is, Ann assumes Rb
1 and Bob assumes Ra
1.
3 STATEMENTS OF RESULTS
Section 3.1 states our main existence results, which 1) show that there exist complete
typestructureswithRCAR; 2)establishthatRCARincompletetypestructuresisanepis-
temic condition for IA; and 3) reconcile these facts with the negative conclusions found
in the literature. Section 3.2 states some complementary results that relate beliefs about
strategies to iterated admissibility. We need these results to prove our existence theo-
rems, but they also merit independent consideration because they reveal certain struc-
tural commonalities of ﬁnite-order reasoning about rationality across complete type
structures. In Section 3.3, we state a sharper form of our main existence theorem that
gives a topological characterization, for a ﬁxed game G, of the RmAR sets in complete
type structures in which the RCAR set is nonempty. Finally, Section 3.4 provides a game-
independent condition for IA that captures the line of reasoning that RCAR describes.
In order to easily distinguish new results from previous results from the literature,
we will reserve the name “Proposition” for previous results from the literature, and use
“Theorem”, “Corollary”, and “Lemma” for new results.
3.1 RCAR AND ITERATED ADMISSIBILITY
Consider the following inﬁnite sequence of statements.
(a1) Ann is rational (b1) Bob is rational
(a2) (a1) and Ann assumes (b1) (b2) (b1) and Bob assumes (a1)
(a3) (a2) and Ann assumes (b2) (b3) (b2) and Bob assumes (a2)
... ...
For each m È 1, the statement “a(m Å1) and b(m Å1)” corresponds to rationality
and m-th order assumption of rationality. The conjunction of this inﬁnite sequence of
statements corresponds to rationality and common assumption of rationality.
A type structure T Æ
­
Sa,Sb,T a,T b,¸a,¸b®
for G provides precise interpretations of
these statements by implicitly deﬁning the possible belief hierarchies of each player.
BFK found that if the universe of beliefs implied byT is rich enough—that is,T is a com-
plete structure—then the set of strategies played when RmAR holds coincides exactly
with the set of (m Å1)-admissible strategies. Proposition 3.1 below is the formal state-
ment of this result.
9Proposition 3.1 (Theorem 9.1 in BFK). Fix a ﬁnite gameG and a complete lexicographic






It is natural to ask whether there is an analogous result that characterizes iterated
admissibility using RCAR. Our main results, Theorems 3.2 and 3.4 below, establish the
epistemic foundations of IA along those lines. In particular, Corollary 3.3 shows that
there exists a complete type structure in which the RCAR set is nonempty, answering an
open question that was asked in BFK.












Corollary 3.3. Fix a ﬁnite gameG. There exists a complete lexicographic type structure T
forG in which Ra
1£Rb
1 is nonempty.
Theorem 3.4. Fix a ﬁnite game G and suppose T is a complete lexicographic type struc-
ture forG such that Ra
1£Rb






In words, Corollary 3.3 says that there exists a complete type structure for G with at
least one state that belongs to the RCAR set. Theorem 3.4 says that, in every complete
typestructureforG inwhichtheRCARsetisnonempty,thesetofstrategiesplayedwhen
RCAR holds is exactly equal to the IA set. Together, Theorems 3.2 and 3.4 say that “RCAR
in complete type structures” is an epistemic condition for IA since 1) every IA strategy
is played under RCAR in some complete type structure; and 2) the strategies that are
played under RCAR in any complete type structure must be IA strategies.
However, it is not the case that every complete type structure for G has a nonempty
RCAR set. Consider the following two results from BFK.
Proposition3.5(Theorem10.1inBFK). FixaﬁnitegameG andacompletelexicographic
type structure T for G such that the maps ¸a,¸b are continuous. If there exist r a,sa,sb
such that ¼a(r a,sb)6Æ¼a(sa,sb) then Ra
1£Rb
1 Æ?.
10Proposition 3.6 (Proposition 7.2 in BFK). For each ﬁnite game G there exists a complete
lexicographic type structure T forG such that the maps ¸a,¸b are continuous.11
These two results together show that there are complete type structures for G in
which the RCAR set is empty. So the set of strategies played when RCAR holds is empty,
but of course the IA set is nonempty.
How do we reconcile our results with Proposition 3.5? In particular, how should we
understand the fact that complete type structures having nonempty RCAR sets cannot
havecontinuoustype-beliefmaps? Todoso,wegiveanimprovementofProposition3.6.
ByaBorelreﬁnementofaPolishspaceT, wemeanaPolishspaceU suchthatU hasthe
same set of points and the same Borel ¾-algebra as T, and every open set in T is open in
U. ThusU has the same Borel sets but more open sets.
Theorem 3.7. Let T Æ
­
Sa,Sb,T a,T b,¸a,¸b®
be a complete lexicographic type structure
foraﬁnitegameG. ThenthereexistBorelreﬁnementsUa,Ub ofT a,T b suchthatthemaps
¸a :Ua !L(Sb £Ub), ¸b :Ub !L(Sa £Ua)
are continuous.
It follows that UÆ
­
Sa,Sb,Ua,Ub,¸a,¸b®
is again a complete type structure forG, so
Theorem 3.7 implies Proposition 3.6. Since the Borel ¾-algebras are unchanged, the sets
of LPS are unchanged, i.e.,
L(Sa £Ua)ÆL(Sa £T a), L(Sb £Ub)ÆL(Sb £T b).
However, more open sets have been added to their topologies.
No state satisfying RCAR exists in the type structure U by Proposition 3.5. Note that
while L(Sb £T b)ÆL(Sb £Ub), it is not the case that L Å(Sb £T b)ÆL Å(Sb £Ub). This
is because full-support LPS’s must assign positive measure to every open set and Ub
contains more open sets than T b does. Effectively, there are fewer full-support types in
Ua than there are in T a. So the operation of reﬁning the topologies of the type spaces in
this fashion shrinks the set of states in which every player is rational.
Thesetoffull-supporttypesshrinksasaconsequenceofamorebasicchange. Recall
that, to assume an event, it is necessary to assign positive measure to every “part” of it.
Any two disjoint parts of an event are topologically distinguishable12 from each other. It
11Since our deﬁnition of complete is slightly different from the deﬁnition in BFK, the proof must use
Theorem 13.7 instead of Theorem 7.9 in Kechris (1995).
12Two events are topologically indistinguishable if one approximates the other and vice versa—that is,
if they have identical closures.
11follows that reﬁning the topology on the state space raises the standards of assumption
for the players. From such a perspective, continuous type structures are type structures
with high standards for assumption.
The description of continuous type structures in BFK as type structures in which
neighboringfull-supportLPS’sareassociatedwithneighboringfull-supporttypes,while
equivalent, does not immediately call this property to attention. Our interpretation of
continuous type structures is that they describe players who are more ﬁnicky about say-
ing that they assume something. They are more agnostic than players in discontinuous
type structures in this sense.
One early interpretation of BFK’s negative result was that RCAR is impossible when
players know too little about each other (since complete type structures are very rich).
Friedenberg(2010)hadpreviouslyshownthatcompact,complete,andcontinuousstan-
dard13 type structures contain all hierarchies of beliefs. While this result had not been
extended to lexicographic type structures, it was reasonable to suppose that the nonex-
istence of RCAR in complete continuous lexicographic type structures was due to the
presence of too many hierarchies of beliefs.
Our Theorem 3.7 says that any complete type structure—even one with nonempty
RCAR—containsexactlythesamesetofhierarchiesofbeliefsassomecompletecontinu-
ous type structure. It permits us to isolate the issue of missing hierarchies and conclude
that RCAR is impossible in complete continuous type structures because players are too
cautious about assuming events in such type structures, and not because they know too
little about their opponents.
TheExistenceTheorem3.2isnotfullysatisfactoryinthesensethatitonlysaysthatif
we ﬁx a game, we can ﬁnd a complete type structure in which RCAR for that ﬁxed game
is nonempty. It is silent on whether, given a pair of ﬁnite strategy sets (Sa,Sb), there is a
single complete type structure in which RCAR for every gameG on (Sa,Sb) is nonempty.
We will remedy this shortcoming in another way in Theorem 3.25.
3.2 STRATEGIC BELIEFS AND ITERATED ADMISSIBILITY
In this section, we give analternate deﬁnition of the IA set in the style of rationalizability
via an iterative reﬁnement of the players’ strategic beliefs—that is, their marginal beliefs
13i.e., type structures with standard probabilities, not lexicographic probabilities.
12over opponents’ strategies.14 We will show that this reﬁnement process captures some
of the structural properties of RmAR sets that are conveniently invariant across all com-
plete type structures. In other words, RmAR sets can be described as having the same
“shape” in a sense across all such type structures. These properties are incredibly useful





ﬁrst introduce some notation. For r a,sa 2Sa and a sequence ºÆ(º0,...,ºn)2N(Sb), we
say that sa is preferred to r a under º, and write sa Âº r a, if the LEU of sa under º is
greater than that of r a—that is, ¼a(sa,º) ÈLEX ¼a(r a,º), where ¼a(sa,º) is the (n Å1)-
tuple (¼a(sa,º0),...,¼a(sa,ºn)). Note that the leftmost term ¼a(sa,º0) has the highest
priority. Intuitively speaking, under belief ºÆ(º0,...,ºn), for each k ·n the strategies in
the support of (º0,...,ºk) are inﬁnitely more likely than the strategies outside the sup-
port of (º0,...,ºk).
Given¹,º2N(Sb),wewrite¹»? ºifforallr a,sa 2Sa, sa Â¹ r a ifandonlyif sa Âº r a.
In other words, ¹»? º if and only if they induce the same preference ordering over pure
strategies. It is easy to see that »? is an equivalence relation. If ¹ Æ (¹0,...,¹m) and
ºÆ(º0,...,ºn) then the concatenation of ¹ and º is deﬁned as the sequence
¹º´((¹º)0,...,(¹º)mÅnÅ1)Æ(¹0,...,¹m,º0,...,ºn).
















1 can be interpreted as the set of strategic beliefs held by rational types.
Fix a complete type structure
­
Sa,Sb,T a,T b,¸a,¸b®
. If Ann is rational then she has a
full-support belief ¹ 2 L Å(Sb £T b) and her strategic belief is margSb ¹. Then the set of
strategic beliefs that may be held by rational Anns is
n




We will call Pa
1 the set of Ann’s rational strategic beliefs. It readily follows that Sa
1 is the
set of strategies played by rational Anns.
14The reﬁnement process may succinctly be described as set-valued lexicographic rationalizability,
given its similarity to Stahl’s (1995) notion of lexicographic rationalizability.
13Following the intuitive description given above, we can say that if Ann holds a strate-
gic belief º 2 Pa
2 then she considers the event that Bob is rational to be inﬁnitely more
likely than the event that he is not. Furthermore, we can say that ºÆmargSb ¹ for some
full-support belief ¹ of Ann that assumes that Bob is rational. An inductive argument
shows that if º 2 Pa
mÅ1 then º is the marginal on Sb of some full-support belief of Ann
that m-th order assumes rationality.
For each º2N(Sb), let O(º) denote the set of all sa 2Sa such that sa is optimal under









We have the following characterization of m-admissible strategies as strategies that
are optimal under strategic beliefs in Pa
m.




m. Each sa 2 Sa
m belongs to some X a 2 Xa
m, and
Xa
m is a set of subsets of Sa
m.
Note that Theorem 3.8 allows us to rewrite the deﬁnition of Pa
mÅ1 without reference
to the m-admissible set Sb
m. In fact, all results in this section would continue to hold















We are also able to show that for every full-support belief ¹ of Ann who m-th order
assumes rationality, there is some º 2 Pa
mÅ1 such that margSb ¹ and º induce the same
preferencesoverAnn’sstrategies—thatis, thestrategicbeliefsinPa
mÅ1 arerepresentative
of Ann’s preferences over her strategies in states of the world satisfying RmAR in a com-
plete type structure. Theorem 3.9 below gives a precise statement of this relationship.
Theorem3.9. In acompletelexicographictype structureforaﬁnite game, foreachm È0,
(i) If (sa,ta)2Ra
m then 9º2Pa
m such that margSb ¸a(ta)»? º; and
(ii) If º2Pa
m then 9(sa,ta)2Ra
m such that margSb ¸a(ta)Æº.
By deﬁnition, a strategy sa is optimal under ¸a(ta) if and only if sa is optimal under
margSb ¸a(ta). Thus we have the following corollary.
14Corollary 3.10. In a complete lexicographic type structure for a ﬁnite game G, for each
m È0, a set X a µSa belongs to Xa
m if and only if there is a state (sa,ta)2Ra
m such that X a




plete type structure forG. To see this, we consider an arbitrary relationQ µSa £T a and
subset X a µSa, and deﬁne
¡a(X a,Q)´
©





In words, ¡a(X a,Q) is the set of all ta 2T a such that the section of Q at ta is exactly X a.
ItisclearthatforeachsetQ µSa£T a, thefamilyofsets
©
¡a(X a,Q): X a µSaª
ispairwise
disjoint, and the union of the family is T a. Thus the nonempty sets in this family form a
ﬁnite partition of T a.
It follows that in any type structure for G, and for each nonempty set X a µ Sa and
m È 0, ¡a(X a,Ra
m) is the set of all types ta for Ann such that X a is the set of optimal
strategies for ¸a(ta), and Ann is open-minded and assumes k-th order rationality for
Bob for all k Çm.15
The next corollary shows that the RmAR sets have similar “shapes” in all complete
type structures for a given ﬁnite gameG.
Corollary 3.11. In a complete lexicographic type structure for a ﬁnite game, for each






is a decreasing chain of Borel sets of T a;
(ii) For each m È0, ¡a(X a,Ra







is an increasing chain of nonempty Borel sets of
T a.
Corollary 3.11 gives us the following useful formula for the RmAR sets in a complete




X a £¡a(X a,Ra




3.3 ALL POSSIBLE RCAR SETS
In this section we state a sharper form of the Existence Theorem 3.2. Consider a com-
plete type structure such that RCAR obtains in some state. Below, we deﬁne an RCAR
15Bob is k-th order rational if he is rational and (k ¡1)-th order assumes rationality.
15tower to be the family of RmAR sets in any such type structure. The results of this sec-
tion give a list of topological properties that characterize RCAR towers.
The sequences of RmAR sets depend on the type structure T as well as the game G.
To indicate this dependence, we will sometimes write Ra




1. Throughout this section, we ﬁx a ﬁnite gameG and a pair of uncountable
Polish spaces T a,T b.



















m are nonempty; and
(ii) There exist maps ¸a,¸b for which T Æ
­
Sa,Sb,T a,T b,¸a,¸b®
is a complete lexico-





Thus every complete type structure with RCAR gives rise to an RCAR tower. The
Existence Theorem 3.2 implies that there exists an RCAR tower. Corollary 3.11 gives a
limitation on the possible RCAR towers—they must have the right “shape”. Property 6.2
in BFK gives a second limitation—two events assumed at the same level must be topo-
logically indistinguishable, so the set Qa
1£Qb
1 must be topologically indistinguishable
from Qa
M £Qb
M for some M. Lemma E.2 in BFK gives a third limitation—for each open-
minded type ta for Ann, there are uncountably many other open-minded types that
have the same optimal strategies and assumptions as ta, and hence each “part” of Qa
m
that is not in Qa
mÅ1 must be uncountable. The following sharp existence theorem says
exactly which families of sets are RCAR towers. In words, it says that a family of sets is an
RCAR tower if and only if it satisﬁes the three limitations above.










is an RCAR tower for






is a decreasing chain of Borel subsets of T a;
(ii) For each m È0, ¡a(X a,Qa
m)6Æ? () X a 2Xa
m;





(v) X a 2Xa
m Æ) ¡a(X a,Qa
m)\¡a(X a,Qa
mÅ1) is uncountable; and
(vi) X a 2Xa
1 Æ) ¡a(X a,Qa
1) is uncountable;
and similarly for b.
Theorem 3.13 shows that the property of being an RCAR tower depends only on the
optimality sets Xa
m,Xb
m. As shown in Section 3.2, these sets capture properties that are
16universal to all complete type structures. Indeed, their deﬁnitions make no reference
to type structures at all. Thus the property of being an RCAR tower is partially robust.
Theorem 3.13 also shows that one has a great deal of control over the properties that the
RmAR sets will have.
Furthermore, Theorem 3.14, which is stated below, shows that any family of sets that
is an RCAR tower is also the family of RmAR sets in some complete one-to-one type
structure for G. By a one-to-one type structure forG we mean a type structure T for G
in which the mappings ¸a,¸b are one-to-one.










is an RCAR tower for









m are nonempty; and
(ii) There exist mappings ¸a,¸b such that TÆhSa,Sb,T a,T b,¸a,¸bi is a complete one-






A consequence of Theorem 3.13 is that the proof of the Existence Theorem 3.2 is re-
duced to the problem of ﬁnding a family of sets that ﬁts the topological characterization
of RCAR towers. The following lemma about Polish spaces, together with Theorem 3.13,
implies Theorem 3.2.
Lemma 3.15. For any ﬁnite game G and uncountable Polish spaces T a,T b, there is a












1 are open and Conditions
1–6 of Theorem 3.13 hold.






and uncountable. By choosing other RCAR towers, one can get a T with various other
properties.
Theorem 3.13 is a very strong result and no comparable analog is in the literature
about standard type structures and RCBR. It is well-known that the sets of states that
satisfy rationality and m-th order belief of rationality (RmBR) being compact for each m
is sufﬁcient for the existence of RCBR (cf. Tan and Werlang, 1988). However, there is no
topological characterization of the RmBR sets in standard type structures with RCBR.
173.4 A GAME-INDEPENDENT CONDITION FOR RCAR
The results of the previous sections have shown that, given any game G, there is a large
class of complete type structures such that RCAR is nonempty when rationality is de-
ﬁned with respect to the speciﬁc game G. Furthermore, if we ﬁx a type structure TG in
this class then the play of the game under RCAR is exactly the IA set of G. However, it
will not necessarily be the case that the RCAR set is nonempty in TG when rationality is
deﬁned with respect to another gameG with the same strategy sets (Sa,Sb).
In the aforementioned type structure TG, players can commonly assume rationality
with respect toG but perhaps not with respect to another game. Our main results of the
earlier sections do not guarantee the existence of any complete type structure in which,
for all gamesG, some state satisﬁes the condition “RCAR with respect toG”.
This form of game-dependence raises the following question: Is there a model envi-
ronmentinwhichthesetofstateswithcommonknowledgeofthegameG isisomorphic
to a complete type structure (e.g., TG) in which common assumption of rationality with
respect to G is possible? In this section, we answer this question in the afﬁrmative. To
do so, we ﬁrst extend the BFK framework to include moves of nature, which choose the
gameG.





where Sa,Sb are nonempty ﬁnite sets, £ is the space of games over (Sa,Sb), V a,V b are
Polish spaces, and ¸a,¸b are Borel functions
¸a :V a !L(££Sb £V b), ¸b :V b !L(££Sa £V a).
WesaythatViscompleteifthemappings¸a,¸b areonto,andone-to-oneifthemap-
pings ¸a,¸b are one-to-one.
Hereafter,Vwilldenotealexicographictypestructurewithnature,andG willdenote
a game in £.
Deﬁnition 3.17. We say that a type va 2V a believes an event E µ ££Sb £V b and write
va 2Ca(E) if
(¸a(va))(E)Æ~ 1,
where~ 1 denotes a ﬁnite sequence of 1s. We say that va believes a gameG and write va 2
Ca
1(G) if va believes {G}£Sb £V b, that is, va 2Ca({G}£Sb £V b).
18We now deﬁne common belief of G. Informally, there is common belief of G if each
playerbelievesG, believesthattheotherplayerbelievesG, believesthattheotherplayer
believes that, and so on.












If both va and vb have common belief of G, we say that the pair (va,vb) has common
belief ofG. We say that there is common knowledge ofG at state (µ,sa,va,sb,vb) if µ ÆG
and (va,vb) has common belief ofG. In other words, common knowledge is equivalent to
true common belief. The common knowledge set for a atG is the set
K a(G)Æ{G}£Sa £Ca
1(G).
One can easily verify that the common knowledge sets K a(G) and K b(G) are Borel
(but possibly empty). We say that V admits common knowledge of G if the sets K a(G)
and K b(G) are nonempty Polish spaces.16 Clearly, K a(G) is a Polish space if and only if
Ca
1(G) is a Polish space.









such that V a
G ÆCa
1(G), and for each va 2V a








an ordinary lexicographic type structure.
We formulate an analog of RCAR with respect to a given game G in type structures
withnaturebyextendingthedeﬁnitionsofassumptionandrationalitytotypestructures
with nature as follows.
Deﬁnition 3.21. We say that a type va 2V a assumes an event E µ££Sb £V b in V, and
write va 2 Aa(E), if ¸a(va)Æ(¹1,...,¹n¡1) such that
(a) ¹i(E)Æ1 for each i · j;
16Note that common knowledge ofG is equivalent to “G and common belief ofG”.
19(b) ¹i(E)Æ0 for each i È j; and
(c) IfU is open withU \E 6Æ? then ¹i(U \E)È0 for some i Çn.
It is easily seen that a pair (sa,va) is rational for G in VG if and only if (sa,va) 2
Sa £V a
G , va assumes Sb £V b
G in VG, and sa maximizes LEU with respect to ¸a
G(va). Our
deﬁnition below ofG-rationality in V follows this pattern.
Deﬁnition 3.22. We say that the triple (µ,sa,va) is G-rational, and write (µ,sa,va) 2
Ra
1(G), if
(i) (µ,sa,va)2K a(G), i.e., there is common knowledge ofG;
(ii) va assumes K b(G) (common knowledge ofG) in V; and
(iii) sa maximizes LEU with respect to ¸a(va).
Deﬁnition 3.23. We say that the triple (µ,sa,va) is G-rational and commonly assumes













between assumption in V and in VG, and between iterated G-rationality in V and iter-
ated rationality forG in VG.
Theorem 3.24. Suppose that V admits common knowledge ofG, and let va 2V a
G . Then
(i) ForallBorelE µSb£V b




(iii) 8m È0, Ra
m(G)Æ{G}£Ra
m(G,VG);
and similarly for b.
We can now state our result that there is a model environment in which, for every game
G, G-RCAR epistemically characterizes the IA set of G. In this environment, which is
a complete lexicographic type structure with nature, G-RCAR may be described as a
game-independent condition in the sense that it can be satisﬁed for every gameG.
Theorem 3.25. For each pair (Sa,Sb) of ﬁnite strategy sets, there is a complete one-to-




for every gameG 2£,
(i) V admits common knowledge ofG;







Here, we give the results of this paper further context by considering their relationship
with other results in the literature.
RCARasanEpistemicCondition As explained in BFK, the RCAR concept corresponds
to a “line of reasoning” where each player considers all possibilities about the beliefs of
the other players. We focus on the question of whether RCAR can provide an epistemic
basis for the IA solution concept. We will compare our results with the literature on the
corresponding question of whether RCBR provides epistemic conditions IU.
Brandenburger and Dekel (1987a) essentially give us the following fact.
Fix a game.
(i) For each type structure, the set of strategies consistent with RCBR is a
subset of the IU strategies.
(ii) There exists a ﬁnite type structure such that the set of strategies con-
sistent with RCBR is exactly the IU set.
This says that if we look at RCBR across all type structures, we get the IU set. Taken
together, our Theorems 3.2 and 3.4 imply the following analogous fact.
Fix a game.
(i) For each complete lexicographic type structure, the set of strategies
consistent with RCAR is a subset of the IA strategies.
(ii) There exists a complete lexicographic type structure such that the set
of strategies consistent with RCAR is exactly the IA set.
This says that if we look at RCAR across all complete lexicographic type structures, we
get the IA set.17
It may appear that this is the end of the matter. However, under the epistemic game
theory(EGT)theoryapproach,thebeliefsthattheplayersdeempossible—andtherefore
the type structure that generates them—are part of the description of the strategic sit-
uation. From the perspective of the players, the type structures other than the one that
describes their strategic situation are simply irrelevant. Such extraneous type structures
may exclude types that the players consider possible or include types that the players
consider impossible.
17BFK showed, if we look at RCAR across all lexicographic type structures, we do not get the IA set.
21While an analyst can ﬁnd a justiﬁcation for each IU strategy by looking across all
type structures, the player, whose perception is conﬁned to the boundaries deﬁned by
the type structure that describes her situation, is not assured of being able to the same.
This raises a question: Can the players themselves see all the IU strategies as the
result of the line of reasoning captured by RCBR? This requires a type structure that is
“rich enough” so that each IU strategy is justiﬁed by some RCBR state. Indeed, many
type structures fail to satisfy such a richness condition.
Brandenburger and Dekel (1987a) showed that, given a ﬁxed game G, one can tailor
the type structure so that the IU strategies of G are the output of RCBR.18 Since this
construction depends on the game G, it may be the case that this type structure is not
“rich enough” to give us the IU strategies of another gameG0 as the output of RCBR.
However, from the perspective of EGT, a good epistemic condition should involve
a line of reasoning for the players that is game-independent (i.e., the reasoning is the
same for all games). This implies that the type structure should be rich enough so that
RCBR produces the IU set for every game. Tan and Werlang (1988) identiﬁed one such
richness condition: In the so-called “universal type structure”, the IU set is character-
ized by RCBR, regardless of the game in question. Friedenberg (2010) showed that any
complete, compact, and continuous type structure also has this property.
This result has no direct analog with respect to RCAR and the IA set. BFK showed
that if a lexicographic type structure is complete and continuous then it contains no
state that satisﬁes RCAR.19 Therefore, if we ﬁx an arbitrary complete type structure, we
cannot say that RCAR is an epistemic condition for IA.
We resolve this issue by showing that there is a type structure that is rich enough in
the sense that it embeds enough complete type structures so that for each game, RCAR
inatleastoneoftheembeddedtypestructuresyieldstheIAsetasoutput. Thisstructure
can be viewed as a model environment in which players can look across many complete
type structures like the aforementioned imaginary analyst so that “RCAR in complete
type structures” is a game-independent epistemic condition for IA. Our Theorem 3.25
shows the existence of such a structure in which an embedded complete type structure
with RCAR for a gameG can be interpreted as describing the set of states with common
knowledge of G. We make this interpretation explicit in our formal treatment, which
18Brandenburger and Dekel (1987a) uses ﬁnite partitions, not ﬁnite type structures. However, a ﬁnite
partition structure is essentially equivalent to some ﬁnite type structure.
19In fact, a complete, compact, and continuous lexicographic type structure does not even exist.
22introduces moves of nature that choose the gameG.
Continuity ThepessimisminBFKwithrespecttoﬁndinganepistemicconditionforIA
strategies was due principally to their ﬁnding that complete continuous type structures
must have empty RCAR sets. Our Theorem 3.2 revived the research program by showing
that there are complete type structures with nonempty RCAR sets. In these type struc-
tures, the belief maps cannot be continuous. This suggested that continuity, which had
appeared to be a technical condition ex ante, changes the players’ reasoning in some
signiﬁcant way. By contrast, the much weaker requirement that the belief mappings are
Borel is a technical condition that provides the structure needed to obtain results.
Our Theorem 3.7 gives a striking way to isolate the effects of continuous belief maps
by showing that, given any complete lexicographic type structure there is a correspond-
ing complete and continuous structure that describes exactly the same beliefs—that is,
the two type structures are equally rich in at least one sense.
The difference between a complete structure T and its continuous counterpart U
given by Theorem 3.7 is that of topological distinguishability, which affects the classiﬁ-
cationofbeliefsratherthanchangingthem. Thusitturnsoutthatatypestructureinthe
BFK framework captures more information than just the players’ possible hierarchies of
beliefs.
In Theorem 3.7, U gives a ﬁner topologization of the state space than T does. How
should we interpret this difference? The topology on a state space, say ­, is essentially
the set of events that open-minded Bayesians must consider in their decision making.
However, we ﬁnditmoreconvenientto startwiththeinterpretationthatatopology sep-
arates and distinguishes hypotheses about the true state of world. Consider two hy-
potheses, which are respectively represented by events E and E0. If their closures are
equal, as determined by a topology T on ­, then it may be said that E and E0 are indis-
tinguishable in T because E approximates E0 in an arbitrarily ﬁne way and vice versa.
Whetheraneventisassumedbyagivenbeliefissensitivetothetopologyonthestate
space. As this topology is successively reﬁned, a given belief will be classiﬁed as assum-
ing fewer and fewer events. We might then informally describe the difference between
T and U as follows: The players in the environment described by the latter are more
cautious about assuming things than the players in the environment described by the
former. This relationship gives an intuitively appealing reconciliation of BFK’s negative
result with our positive result. Players described by continuous type structures are just
23too cautious to commonly assume rationality.
Furthermore,itisapparentthatadecisionmakerwhoassignsanon-zeroprobability
to eachopensetissimplygivingproper considerationto alldistinguishable hypotheses.
Therefore,itiseventhecasethattherationalplayersdescribedbyUmustbemoreopen-
minded than the rational players described by T.
Other Approaches Alternate routes to an epistemic condition for IA may also exist.
The most direct path of attack would be to ask, as we did at the end of Subsection 3.1,
whether there exists a single complete lexicographic type structure—perhaps an analog
of the universal type structure—in which the IA set of every game is the output of RCAR.
A second option would be to weaken the criteria for assumption so that they are
not sensitive to variations in topological distinguishability. However, we do not want
to weaken assumption so much that we no longer get IA as an output of RCAR. Ana-
lyzing the complete lexicographic type structures constructed in this paper may pro-
vide some hints on how to achieve these goals. Roughly speaking, beliefs that manifest
the so-called Best Rationalization Principle that was articulated in Battigalli (1996) also
satisfy common assumption of rationality in our constructions. In other words, if Ann
attributes each admissible choice sb of Bob to a rational decision based on the high-
est order mutual assumption of rationality that is consistent with it, then her beliefs
satisfy common assumption of rationality. Ann, if her beliefs reﬂect the Best Rational-
ization Principle, can be viewed as assigning ex-ante explanations of all possible actions
of Bob—explanations that preserve as much higher order assumption of rationality as
possible.
Yang (2010) uses lexicographic type structures with a ﬁxed ﬁnite bound M on the
length of LPS’s, and introduces a notion of weak assumption in place of assumption.
This gives an alternative epistemic characterization of IA where the players do not con-
sider possibilities involving iterated beliefs longer than M.
A third option is to adopt an approach in which admissibility itself is not justiﬁed
on an epistemic basis, thus skirting around the inclusion-exclusion problem. Barelli
and Galanis (2010) gives an alternative epistemic condition for IA that is built on event-
rationality, which, like LEU, is an extension of the standard model of Bayesian rational-
ity. An event-rational decision maker evaluates acts based on her standard probability
beliefs and break ties using her personal list of tie-breakers. In that approach, admissi-
bilityisobtainedbyrequiringthathertie-breakerlisthassufﬁcientcoverage,ratherthan
24by requiring that she has full-support beliefs (i.e., an open-minded epistemic state).
A PROOFS OF THEOREMS 3.4 AND 3.7
A Borel reﬁnement of a Polish space T is a Polish space U such that U has the same
points as T, and every open set in T is open in U. To prove Theorem 3.7, we need the
following results about Borel reﬁnements.
PropositionA.1(15.4inKechris(1995)). IfT isaPolishspaceandU isaBorelreﬁnement
of T, then T andU have the same Borel sets.
Proposition A.2 (13.11 in Kechris (1995)). Suppose T is a Polish space, Y is a second
countable space, and f : T ! Y is a Borel function. Then there is a Borel reﬁnementU of
T such that f :U !Y is continuous.20
Proposition A.3 (13.3 in Kechris (1995)). Let T be a Polish space and for each n 2 N,
let Tn Æ (T,Tn) be a Borel reﬁnement of T. Let T1 Æ (T,T1) where T1 is the topology
generated by
S
n2NTn. Then T1 is a Borel reﬁnement of T. We say that T1 is the coarsest
Borel reﬁnement of the family {Tn :n 2N}.
PropositionA.4(Portmanteautheorem,17.20inKechris(1995)). Let X beaPolishspace,
let M(X) be the space of Borel probability measures on X, and let O be an open basis for
X. A sequence ¹k weakly converges to ¹ in M(X) if and only if liminfk ¹k(O) ¸ ¹(O) for
every O 2O.
This result is stated for all open sets in Kechris (1995), but the version stated here
with an open basis follows from the proof.
Proof of Theorem 3.7. Let T a
0 Æ T a and T b
0 Æ T b. Using Proposition A.2 countably many
times, we obtain sequences of Polish spaces T a
n,T b
n such that for each n, T a
nÅ1 is a Borel
reﬁnement of T a
n (and hence of T a), and ¸a is continuous from T a
nÅ1 to L(Sb £T b
n). Let
Ua be the coarsest Borel reﬁnement of {Tn :n 2N}, and deﬁne Ub analogously. Since
each open set in T a
nÅ1 is open inUa, ¸a is continuous fromUa to L(Sb £T b
n) for each n.
Suppose that ua
k converges to ua inUa. Then for each n, ¸a(ua
k) converges to ¸a(ua)
in L(Sb £T b
n). For some `, we have ¸a(ua) 2 N`(Sb £Ub). Then ¸a(ua
k) 2 N`(Sb £Ub)
for all but ﬁnitely many k, so we may assume this holds for all k. Let ¹k,m be the m-th
20Note that each subspace of a Polish space is second countable.
25coordinateof¸a(ua
k),andlet¹m bethem-thcoordinateof¸a(ua). Henceforeachn and
each m · `, ¹k,m weakly converges to ¹m in M(Sb £T b
n). By the Portmanteau theorem,
liminfk ¹m,k(O) ¸ ¹m(O) for each m,n and each open set O in Sb £T b
n. Since the open
sets in Sb £T b
n, n 2N form an open basis for Sb £Ub, it follows from the other direction
of the Portmanteau theorem A.4 that for each m · `, ¹k,m weakly converges to ¹m in
M(Sb£Ub). Therefore, ¸a(ua
k) converges to ¸a(ua) in L(Sb£Ub). This shows that ¸a is
continuous fromUa to L(Sb £Ub).
To prove Theorem 3.4, we need two results from BFK about assumption.
PropositionA.5 (Property 6.2 in BFK). Let X be a Polish space, E,F be Borel subsets of X,
and ¾Æ(¹0,...,¹m¡1) a full-support LPS on X. If ¾ assumes both E and F the same level,
then E ÆF.
Proposition A.6 (Property 6.3 in BFK). Let X be a Polish space, k 2 N, and ¾ 2 L Å(X).
Suppose En,n 2N are Borel sets in X, and En is assumed under ¾ at level k for each n 2N.
Then
T
n2NEn is assumed under ¾ at level k.21
Proof of Theorem 3.4. By the premise, 9(sa,ta,sb,tb) 2 Ra
1 £Rb
1. Furthermore, the LPS





many m, and a smallest M such that ¾ assumes Rb
M at level k. By Propositions A.6
and A.5, ¾ assumes Rb






£T b is open for all sb 2Sb, Rb
1 ÆRb








m for all m ¸ M. Analogously, projSa Ra
1 ÆSa
1.
B PROOFS OF THEOREMS 3.8 AND 3.9
For convenience we let Sa
0 ´Sa and Ra
0 ´Sa £T a, and similarly for b.








Proof of Lemma B.1. The proof is by induction. The base case (m Æ 1) holds trivially.
Assume the result for m. Then by deﬁnition, the following are equivalent to ¹2Pa
mÅ1.
21The proof in BFK establishes the result as stated here, but the statement in BFK did not mention the
level.
26. ¹Æºº0 for some º,º0 2N(Sb) such that SuppºÆSb
m and º0 2Pa
m;
. ¹ Æ ºmºm¡1......º0 for some º0,...,ºm¡1,ºm 2 N(Sb) such that Suppºk Æ Sb
k for
all k ·m.
This completes the induction.
Lemma B.2. For each m È0 we have Pa
mÅ1 µPa
m.
Proof. Suppose ¹ 2 Pa
mÅ1. By Lemma B.1, ¹ can be written as ºmºm¡1...º0 where ºk 2
N(Sb) and Suppºk Æ Sb
k for all k · m. Then Suppºmºm¡1 Æ Sb
m¡1, and by Lemma B.1,
we have ¹2Pa
m.
We will need the following result, which is Proposition 1 in Blume, Brandenburger,
and Dekel (1991b).
Proposition B.3. For each º 2 N(Sb) there is a probability measure ½ 2 M(Sb) such that
Supp½ ÆSuppº and (½)»? º.
Lemma B.4. For each m 2 N and ¾ 2 Pa
mÅ1, there exists º Æ (º0,...,ºm) 2 NmÅ1(Sb) such
that º»? ¾ and Suppºm¡k ÆSb
k for each k ·m (so º2Pa
mÅ1 by Lemma B.1).
Proof of Lemma B.4. We argue by induction on m. The result for m Æ 0 follows from
Proposition B.3. Suppose the result holds for m, and let ¾2Pa
mÅ2. Then ¾Æ¾0¾00 where
¾0 2 N(Sb), Supp¾0 Æ Sb
mÅ1, and ¾00 2 Pa
mÅ1. By inductive hypothesis, there exists º Æ
(º1,...,ºmÅ1) 2 NmÅ1(Sb) such that º »? ¾00 and SuppºmÅ1¡k Æ Sb
k for each k · m. By
PropositionB.3thereexistsº0 2M(Sb)suchthatSuppº0 ÆSupp¾0 ÆSb
mÅ1 andº0 »? ¾0.
Then
º0ºÆ(º0,º1,...,ºmÅ1)»? ¾,
so the result holds for mÅ1.
Lemma B.5. If º,º0 2N(Sb) then O(ºº0)µO(º).
Proof of Lemma B.5. It is easily seen that if r a Âº sa then r a Âºº0 sa. If sa 2 O(ºº0) then
there is no r a such that r a Âºº0 sa, so there is no r a such that r a Âº sa, and thus sa 2
O(º).
Proof of Theorem 3.8. The proof is by induction on m. First, the base case: Since Pa
1 Æ
N Å(Sb) and Sa



















mÅ1 in two steps.




mÅ1. Equivalently, we want to show that
O(¹) µ Sa
mÅ1 for any ¹ 2 Pa
mÅ1. By Lemma B.4 there exists º Æ (º0,...,ºm) 2 NmÅ1(Sb)
such that º »? ¹ and Suppºm¡k Æ Sb
k for each k · m. Then O(º) Æ O(¹). By Lemma B.5,
O(¹) Æ O(º) µ O(º0). By Lemma B.2, ¹ 2 Pa
m, so O(¹) 2 Xa





m, we then have O(¹) µ Sa
m. We note that Suppº0 Æ Sb











mÅ1. Equivalently, we want to show that, for
each sa 2Sa
mÅ1,thereexistsa¹2Pa
mÅ1 suchthat sa 2O(¹). If sa 2Sa
mÅ1,thenforeachk ·
m we have sa 2 Sa
kÅ1, so there exists ºk 2 N1(Sb) such that Suppºk Æ Sb
k and sa 2 O(ºk).
By Lemma B.5, sa 2O(¹) where ¹Æºmºm¡1...º0. By Lemma B.1, ¹2Pa
mÅ1.
FortheproofofTheorem3.9,wewillneedthefollowingtworesults. Theresultbelow
is an immediate consequence of Lemma E.2 in BFK.
PropositionB.6. For each LPS ¾2L Å(Sb£T b) there are continuum-many ˆ ¾2L Å(Sb£
T b) such that
(i) margSb ¾ÆmargSb ˆ ¾;
(ii) For each Borel set E µSb£T b and each k 2N, E is assumed under ¾ at level k if and
only if E is assumed under ˆ ¾ at level k.
Proposition B.7 (Lemma E.3 in BFK). In a complete lexicographic type structure for G,




Proof of Theorem 3.9. Proof of (i). We want to show that (sa,ta) 2 Ra
mÅ1 Æ) 9º 2 Pa
mÅ1
suchthatmargSb ¸a(ta)»? º. Let¾Æ(¹0,...,¹n)Æ¸a(ta). Foreachk ·m, let[k]denote
the level at which ¾ assumes Rb
k. Then n Æ [0] ¸ ¢¢¢ ¸ [m]. For the proof of (i) only, let
ºk Æ margSb(¹0,...,¹[k]) for each k · m. Then º0 Æ margSb ¾. Since ¾ assumes Rb
k at
level [k], we see from Proposition 3.1 that Suppºk Æ projSb Rb
k Æ Sb
k. Note that for each
k ·m, ºkÅ1 is an initial segment of ºk. It is readily veriﬁed that if º is an initial segment
of º0 then ºº0 »? º0. It follows by induction that ºmºm¡1...ºk »? ºk for each k Çm, and
hence ºmºm¡1...º0 »? º0 ÆmargSb ¾. By Lemma B.1, ºmºm¡1...º0 2Pa
mÅ1.
Proof of (ii). We want to show that º2Pa
mÅ1 Æ) 9(sa,ta)2Ra
mÅ1 s.t. margSb ¸a(ta)Æ
º. By Lemma B.1, we can write º as ºmºm¡1...º0, where Suppºk ÆSb
k for all k ·m.
We ﬁrst consider ºm. We can write ºm Æ (ºm
0 ,...,ºm
n ) where each ºm
i is a probabil-
ity measure on Sb. By Proposition 3.1, Suppºm Æ Sb
m Æ projSb Rb
m. By Proposition B.6,
28for each sb 2 Sb




m is uncountable. Since Sb is ﬁnite and T b is
separable, Rb
m has a countable dense subset. We may therefore pick sets Y0,...,Yn such
that
. The sets Yi are countable and pairwise disjoint;
. The union Y0[¢¢¢[Yn is a dense subset of Rb
m; and
. For each i ·n, projSb Y m
i ÆSuppºm
i .








). This gives probability measures ¹m
i 2M(Sb £T b) such
that Supp¹m
i ¶ Yi, ¹m
i (Yi) Æ 1, and margSb ¹m
i Æ ºm
i . Then the measures ¹m
i ,i · n are
mutually singular, so the (n Å1)-tuple ¹m ´ (¹m
0 ,...,¹m
n ) is an LPS such that Supp¹m ¶
Rb
m, ¹m(Rb
m)Æ~ 1, and margSb ¹m Æºm.




By the above construction with Rb
k \Rb
kÅ1 in place of Rb





kÅ1)Æ~ 1, and margSb ¹k Æºk.
Now, let¹betheconcatenation¹´¹m¹m¡1...¹0. ThenmargSb ¹Æº, and¹isafull-
support LPS that assumes Rb
k for all k · m. By completeness, there exists a type ta 2 T a
suchthat¸a(ta)Æ¹. Since¹hasfullsupport,thereexistsan sa 2Sa suchthat(sa,ta)isa
rational pair. Then (sa,ta) satisﬁes rationality and m-th order assumption of rationality,
so (sa,ta)2Ra
mÅ1.
For each ¾ 2 L(Sb £T b), let O(¾) be the set of all strategies sa 2 Sa that are optimal
under margSb ¾
Proof of Corollary 3.10. Note that for each ¾2L(Sb £T b), we have O(¾)ÆO(margSb ¾).













Proof of Corollary 3.11. Proof of (i). By Lemma C.4 in BFK, each of the sets Ra
m is Borel.
Since Sa is ﬁnite, each of the sets ¡a(X a,Ra
m) is Borel. Let Ua
m is the set of Ann’s full-



















m, and therefore ¡a(X a,Ra
mÅ1)µ¡a(X a,Ra
m). This proves (i).

















Proof of (iii). Since T is complete, there exists ta 2 T a such that Ann is not open-
minded, so there is no sa such that (sa,ta) 2 Ra
1 and hence ta 2 ¡(?,Ra
1). ¡a(?,Ra
m) is
the complement of the union of the sets ¡a(X a,Ra





is an increasing sequence of Borel sets.
C POLISH SPACES AND ASSUMPTION
In this section we establish some useful properties of Polish spaces and assumption. A
topological space (X,T ) is called Polish if it is separable and completely metrizable. It
is well known that all uncountable subsets of Polish spaces have cardinality equal to 2@0
(i.e., the cardinality of the continuum). This is a consequence of Proposition C.1 below.
TheCantorspaceC istheset{0,1}N endowedwiththeproducttopology. ItisaPolish
spaceofcardinality2@0. ACantorsetC inatopologicalspace X isahomeomorphiccopy
of C in X—that is, (C,T jC) is homeomorphic to C, whereT jC Æ
©
U \C :U 2T
ª
is the
subspace topology onC. A subset of a topological space is perfect if it is closed and has
no isolated points.
PropositionC.1(The Perfect Set Theorem for Borel Sets, 13.6 in Kechris, 1995). Let X be
a Polish space and A µ X be Borel. Then either A is countable, or else A contains a Cantor
set and has cardinality 2@0.
Proposition C.2 (Cantor-Bendixson, 6.4 in Kechris, 1995). Let X be a Polish space. Then
X hasauniqueperfectsubsetP suchthat X \P iscountableandopen. Furthermore, every
open neighborhood of every x 2P is uncountable.
Lemma C.3. Let X be an uncountable Polish space and n 2 N. Then there exist disjoint
open setsU1,...,Un in X such that




Proof of Lemma C.3. By Proposition C.2, X has a perfect subset P such that X \P is
countable and open. We can choose n Å1 distinct points x1,...,xnÅ1 2 P. Since X is
metrizable, it is normal—that is, any two disjoint closed sets in X have disjoint open
30neighborhoods. It follows that there exist disjoint open sets U1,...,UnÅ1 such that xj 2
Uj for all j. By Proposition C.2, U1,...,UnÅ1 are uncountable. Finally, X \
U
{U1,...,Un}
is uncountable since it containsUnÅ1, which is itself uncountable.
Lemma C.4. C Æ
U
n2NKn, where (K0,K1,...) is a sequence of disjoint uncountable com-
pact sets.
Proof of Lemma C.4. Deﬁne K0,K1,... as follows.
K0 Æ{0}
N[{c 2C :c0 Æ1};
8n È0, Kn Æ{c 2C :(8k Çn)ck Æ0^cn Æ1}.
For each n È0, Kn is a Cantor set, and therefore it is uncountable and compact. K0 is the
union of a Cantor set and a single point, therefore it is also uncountable and compact.
By construction, C Æ
U
n2NKn, and (K0,K1,...) is a sequence of disjoint sets.
GivenaPolishspace(X,O(X)),aBorelsubspaceof X isatopologicalspace(A,O(A))
where A is a nonempty Borel subset of X endowed with the subspace topology O(A) Æ
{U \ A :U 2O(X)}.
Proposition C.5 (Borel Isomorphism Theorem, Theorem 15.6 in (Kechris, 1995)). Let
A,B be Borel subspaces of Polish spaces. If card(A) Æ card(B), then there is a one-to-one
Borel mapping from A onto B.22
LemmaC.6. Let X,Y bePolishspaces,andlet{Xn :n 2N}and{Yn :n 2N}bebecountable
partitions of X,Y into Borel sets such that card(Xn)Æcard(Yn) for each n 2N. Then there
is a one-to-one Borel mapping from X onto Y that maps Xn onto Yn for each n 2N.
Proof of Lemma C.6. Each of the sets Xn,Yn with its subspace topology is a Borel sub-
space of a Polish space. By Proposition C.5, for each n 2 N there is a one-to-one Borel
mapping ¸n from Xn onto Yn. Then the union ¸ Æ
S
n2N¸n is a one-to-one Borel map-
ping from X onto Y that sends Xn onto Yn for each n 2N, as required.
We will need the following facts from BFK about assumption.
Proposition C.7 (Lemma C.3 in BFK). For each Polish space X and Borel set E in X, the
set of ¾2L Å(X) such that E is assumed under ¾ is Borel.
22In Kechris, 1995, this result is stated in terms of standard Borel spaces, which are the measure spaces
associated with Borel subspaces of Polish spaces.
31Proposition C.8 (Lemma B.1 in BFK23). Let X be a Polish space, E be a Borel subset of X,
¾ Æ (¹0,...,¹n¡1) be a full-support LPS on X, and k Ç n. Then ¾ assumes E at level k if
and only if the following conditions are met.
(i) ¹i(E)Æ1 for each i ·k;




In a topological space, a set D is said to be dense in a set E if D µE and D ÆE. Note
that if D1 is dense in E1 and D2 is dense in E2, then D1[D2 is dense in E1[E2. Also, if D
is dense in E and D µF µE, then D is dense in F and F is dense in E.
Lemma C.9. Let X be a Polish space, and E an uncountable Borel set in X. Then there
exists a Cantor setC µE such that E \C is uncountable and E \C is dense in E.
Proof of Lemma C.9. The Cantor space C contains the Cantor set {(0,0),(1,1)}N and the
complement of this set is uncountable and dense in C. By Proposition C.1, E contains
a Cantor set D. It follows that D contains a Cantor set C such that D \C is uncountable
and dense in D. But D µE, soC µE, and E \C is uncountable and dense in E.
Lemma C.10. Let X be a Polish space, andU0 an uncountable open set in X. Then there
exists a decreasing sequence of open sets (U0,U1,U2,...) such that
(i) For all n 2N,Un \UnÅ1 is uncountable;
(ii) U1 ´
T
n2NUn is an uncountable open set; and
(iii) U1 is dense inU0.
Proof of Lemma C.10. By Lemma C.9, there exists a Cantor set C µU0 such that U0 \C
is uncountable and dense in U0. By Lemma C.4, there exists a sequence (K0,K1,...) of
disjoint uncountable compact sets such that
U
n2NKn ÆC. For each n È 0, deﬁne Un ´
U0 \
U
jÇnKj. Then Un is open, and Un \UnÅ1 Æ Kn, which is uncountable. Moreover,
U1 ÆU0\C, soU1 is uncountable, open, and dense inU0.
LemmaC.11. Let X,Y be Polish spaces, X ﬁnite, and let Z0 Æ X £Y . Let ºÆ(º0,...,ºm)2
NmÅ1(X). If (Z1,Z2,...,ZmÅ1) is a decreasing sequence of nonempty Borel subsets of Z0
such that
8k ·m, projX Zk ÆprojX(Zk \ZkÅ1) and Suppºm¡k ÆprojX Zk
then there exists ¹Æ(¹0,...,¹m)2L Å
mÅ1(Z) such that
23The proof in BFK establishes this fact, but statement of Lemma B.1 was garbled in BFK.
32(i) margX ¹Æº;
(ii) 8k ·m, ¹ assumes Zk at level m¡k;
(iii) ¹ does not assume ZmÅ1; and
(iv) 8x 2projX ZmÅ1, ¹0(ZmÅ1\({x}£Y ))È0.
Proof of Lemma C.11. Using the fact that Polish spaces are separable, there is a count-
able subsetU of Z0 such thatU \ZmÅ1 is dense in ZmÅ1, andU \(Zk \ZkÅ1) is dense in
Zk \ZkÅ1 for each k ·m. It follows thatU \Zk is dense in Zk for each k ·m.
Choose any ½ 2 M(Z0) such that ½(U) Æ 1 and ½({u}) È 0 for each u 2U. Since U is
dense in Z0, ½ 2 MÅ(Z0). For all k 2 N, let Xk ´ projX Zk. For all x 2 X and k 2 N, let
Zk(x)Æ Zk \({x}£Y ). This set is clearly Borel. Since X is ﬁnite, it readily follows that
8x 2 Xk,k ¸0, Zk(x)\U 6Æ? and dense in Zk(x);
8x 2 Xk,k ·m, (Zk(x)\ZkÅ1(x))\U 6Æ? and dense in Zk(x)\ZkÅ1(x).
Note that, for every Borel setV of Z0 such thatV \U is nonempty, the conditional mea-









It is clear from these deﬁnitions that
Pm
kÆ0¹k and ½ are mutually absolutely con-
tinuous. Therefore ¹ Æ (¹0,...,¹m) is a full-support LPS on Z0. It is also clear that
¹0(ZmÅ1(x))È0 for each x 2 XmÅ1, and that margX ¹k Æºk for all k ·m.
For each k ·m, Zk µSupp(¹0,...,¹m¡l), because Zk\S is dense in Zk. Using Propo-
sition C.8, we can easily verify that for all k ·m, ¹ assumes Zk at level m¡k. Zm \ZmÅ1
has a nonempty intersection with U, so ¹0 gives the set positive probability. However,
since ¹0(Zm)Æ1, it follows that ¹0(ZmÅ1)Ç1. Proposition C.8 makes it clear that ¹ does
not assume Zk when k Èm.
Lemma C.12. Let X,Y be Polish spaces with X be ﬁnite, and let Z0 Æ X £Y . Let º Æ
(º0,...,ºm) 2 NmÅ1(X), and let (Z1,Z2,...) a strictly decreasing sequence of nonempty
Borel subsets of Z0, such that
8k ¸0, projX Zk ÆprojX(Zk \ZkÅ1);
8k ·m, Suppºm¡k ÆprojX Zk;
Z1 ´
\
{Zk :k 2N} is dense in Zm.
33Then there exists ¹Æ(¹0,...,¹m)2L Å
mÅ1(Z) such that
(i) For all k ·m, ¹ assumes Zk at level m¡k;
(ii) For all k Èm, ¹ assumes Zk at level 0;
(iii) margX ¹Æº.
Proof of Lemma C.12. For each k 2 N[{1}, let Xk ´ projX Zk, and for each x 2 X, let
Zk(x) Æ Zk \({x}£Y ). Since Z1 is dense in Zm and X is ﬁnite, we have X1 Æ Xm, and




. for each k ·m, Á assumes Zk at level m¡k;
. for each x 2 Xm, ¹0(Z1(x))È0.
Then the conditional probability Á0(¢jZ1(x)) is well-deﬁned for each x 2 Xm. For each





By construction, Supp¹0 Æ SuppÁ0(¢jZ1) Æ Z1 Æ Zm Æ SuppÁ0. Therefore, it is read-
ily apparent that Supp(¹0,...,¹m) Æ Supp(Á0,...,Ám) Æ Z0. We have Suppº0 Æ Xm, so
¹0(Z1)Æ¹0(Zm)Æº0(Xm)Æ1.
By Proposition C.8, we can easily verify that ¹ assumes Zk at level 0 for all k ¸m.
D PROOFS OF THEOREMS 3.2, 3.13, AND 3.14
Theorem 3.13 says that a necessary and sufﬁcient condition for a family of sets to be an
RCARtoweristhatthesetshavetheright“shape”,thattheintersectionsaretopologically
indistinguishable from the sets at some ﬁnite level, and that each “part” is uncountable.
The ingredients for the proof are given in the preceding two subsections. To prove ne-
cessity, we must show for that in every complete type structure for G, the RmAR sets
must satisfy conditions (i)–(vi) of Theorem 3.13. To prove sufﬁciency, one must start
with a given family of sets that satisfy conditions (i)–(vi), and construct a pair of Borel
mappings ¸a,¸b such that the resulting type structure has the given sets as its RmAR
sets. Our construction will produce mappings that are one-to-one, so we will get a proof
of Theorem 3.14 as well. The idea is to construct these mappings by gluing together
countablymanyBorelmappingsfrompiecesofT a tocorrespondingsetsofbeliefsabout
Sb £T b.
34As we have done throughout the paper, we ﬁx the underlying gameG. We also ﬁx T a
and T b and assume that they are uncountable Polish spaces.
Lemma D.1 (Necessity half of Theorem 3.13). Let T a,T b be uncountable Polish spaces.
Every RCAR tower for (G,T a,T b) satisﬁes (i)–(vi) of Theorem 3.13.




















m is assumed under ¾ for each m È 0. Then by the same argument that
was used in the proof of Theorem 3.4, we see that Rb
1 ÆRb
M for some M È0, as required.
Proof of (iv.) Since T b is uncountable, there are uncountably many LPS’s on Sb £T b
that do not have full support. T is complete, so there are uncountably many ta 2 T a
such that ¸a(ta) do not have full support, and hence ta 2¡(?,Qa
1).
Proof of (v). Let X a 2 Xa
m. This means that there exists º 2 Pa
m such that O(º) Æ X a.
By Lemma B.4 we may take º to be of the form º Æ (º0,...,ºm¡1) where each ºk is a
measure on Sb. By Lemma B.1, for each k Ç m we have Suppºm¡1¡k Æ Sb
k. By Propo-
sition 3.1, each of the sets Rb
k is nonempty, and projSb Rb
k Æ Sb
k. By Lemma C.11, there
exists ¹2L Å(Sb £T b) such that
. margSb ¹Æº;
. for all k Çm, ¹ assumes Rb
k at level m¡1¡k;
. ¹ does not assume Rb
m.
Because T is complete, there exists ta 2 T a such that ¸a(ta) Æ ¹. It follows that ta 2
¡a(X a,Ra
m)\¡a(X a,Ra




Proofof(vi). Let X a 2Xa
1, and let M be large enough so that X a 2Xa
M and (iii) holds
for M. As in the preceding paragraph, there exists º 2 Pa
M of the form º Æ (º0,...,ºM¡1)
such that O(º)Æ X a. By Lemma C.12, there exists ¹2L Å(Sb £T b) such that
. margSb ¹Æº;
. for all k Ç M, ¹ assumes Rb
k at level M ¡1¡k;
. for all k ¸ M, ¹ assumes Rb
k at level 0.
By Proposition A.6, ¹ assumes Rb
1 at level 0. As before, because T is complete, there ex-
ists ta 2T a such that ¸a(ta)Æ¹. It follows that ta 2¡a(X a,Ra
1), so this set is nonempty,
and by Proposition B.6, ¡a(X a,Ra
1) is uncountable.
35Lemma D.2 (Sufﬁciency half of Theorems 3.13 and 3.14). Let G be a ﬁnite game and




that satisﬁes (i)–(vi) of Theorem 3.13, there is a complete one-to-one lexicographic type




m for all m È 0, and the RCAR set is
nonempty.
Proof of Lemma D.2. Wemustﬁndapairofone-to-oneBorelmappings¸a,¸b suchthat




m for all m È 0.
(vi) will guarantee that T has an RCAR state.












(d) 8X a 2Xa
1, ¡a(X a,Qa
1).
We now introduce notation for the sets of beliefs that correspond to the sets of types
¡a(X a,Qa
m). Foreachm È0andeach X a 2Xa
m, let¤a
m(X a,Q)bethesetofall¹suchthat
. ¹2L Å(Sb £T b);
. O(¹)Æ X a;
. For all k Çm,Qb
k is assumed under ¹.
We also let ¤a








It follows from Proposition C.7 that for each m È 0 and X a 2 Xa
m, the set ¤a
m(X a,Q) is












(d’) 8X a 2Xa
1, ¤a
1(X a,Q).
We show that each of the sets listed in (a’)–(d’) is uncountable. The case (c’) is listed
separatelybecauseinthatcase¤a
mÅ1(X a,Q)isempty. ByPropositionB.6,itisenoughto




(a’) Since T b is inﬁnite, there are probability measures on Sb£T b which do not have
full support, so the set ¤a
1(?,Q) is nonempty.
(b’) Let m È 0 and X a 2 Xa
mÅ1. By (i) and (ii), Qb
1,...,Qb
m is a strictly decreasing se-





By Lemma C.11 there exists ¹ 2 L Å(Sb £T b) such that O(¹) Æ X a, and Qb
k is as-
sumed under ¹ for all k Ç m, but Qb
m is not assumed under ¹. This shows that the set
¤a
m(X a,Q)\¤a
mÅ1(X a,Q) is nonempty.





(d’) Let X a 2Xa
1. Qb
1,Qb
2,... is a strictly decreasing sequence of nonempty Borel sub-




kÅ1). By (iii), there exists M È 0 such that Qb
1 is dense in Qb
M. Then by Lemma C.12,
there exists ¹ 2 L Å(Sb £T b) such that O(¹) Æ X a, and Qb
k is assumed under ¹ for all
k 2N. Therefore, the set ¤a
1(X a,Q) is nonempty.
We can now apply Lemma C.6 to obtain a bijective Borel map ¸a from T a onto



















A mapping ¸b :T b !L(Sa £T a) can be constructed similarly. The resulting type struc-
ture T is a complete one-to-one type structure for G. Using the deﬁnition of Ra
m, it fol-
lows by induction thatQa
m ÆRa
m for all m È0. Therefore, Q is an RCAR tower.
Theorems 3.13 and 3.14 both follow immediately from Lemmas D.1 and D.2.
Proof of Lemma 3.15. By LemmaC.3, wemay chooseaﬁnitefamilyofdisjointuncount-
able open sets
¡1(X a)µT a,X a 2Xa
1
such that the complement of their union is also uncountable.
Let M belargeenoughsothatXa
M ÆXa
1. Consideran X a 2Xa
1\Xa
M. Thereisaunique
m Ç M such that X a 2 Xa
m \Xa
mÅ1. By Lemma C.10, there is a ﬁnite decreasing chain of
37uncountable open sets
¡1(X a)¶¡2(X a)¶...¡m(X a)
such that the difference ¡k(X a)\¡kÅ1(X a) is uncountable whenever 0 Ç k Ç m. Now,
consider an X a 2 Xa
M. By Lemma C.10 again, there is an inﬁnite decreasing chain of
uncountable open sets ¡1(X a)¶¡2(X a)¶... such that
. ¡k(X a)\¡kÅ1(X a) is uncountable whenever k È0;
. ¡1(X a)´
T
kÈ0¡k(X a) is an uncountable open set;
. ¡1(X a) is dense in ¡M(X a).




m X a £¡m(X a). Then Qa
m is open for each m È 0,
and Qa
1 is open. It follows from our construction that ¡m(X a) Æ ¡a(X a,Qa
m) for each
m È0 and X a 2Xa
m, and that (i)–(vi) of Theorem 3.13 hold.
Theorem 3.2 now follows at once from Theorem 3.13 and Lemma 3.15.
E PROOF OF THEOREM 3.24
Proof of Lemma 3.20. Let va 2 V a
G and let ¸a(va) Æ ¾ Æ (¾0,...,¾k). Then ¸a
G(va) is the
marginal ½ Æ(½0,...,½k) of ¾ on Sb £V b, so ¸a
G is a Borel map fromV a into N (Sb £V b).
¾ is mutually singular, so there are pairwise disjoint Borel setsUi µ££Sb£V b such that
¾i(Ui) Æ 1 for each i · k. The G-sections Wi Æ {(sb,vb) : (G,sb,vb) 2Ui} are Borel and
pairwise disjoint. Since va 2V a
G µCa
1(G), ¾({G}£Sb £V b) Æ~ 1. Therefore ½i(Wi) Æ 1 for
each i ·k, and hence ½ 2L(Sb £V b).
Lemma E.1. Let £,X,Y be Polish spaces, where Y µ X, and letG 2£. Then
(i) For each open U in the topology of {G}£X, there exists an open W in the topology
of ££Y such that W ÆU \({G}£Y ); and
(ii) For each open W in the topology of ££Y , there exists an openU in the topology of
{G}£X such that W ÆU \({G}£Y ).
Proof of Lemma E.1. Both(i)and(ii)followimmediatelyfromthedeﬁnitionofsubspace
topology.
Proof of Theorem 3.24. Proof of (i). Since va 2V a
G ÆCa
1(G), ¸a(va)m({G}£Sb £V b) Æ 1.
Therefore (¸a
G(va))(E) Æ ¸a(va)(££E) Æ (¸a(va))({G}£E). So if va assumes E in V or
38{G}£E in VG, then
(¸a
G(va))(E)Æ(1,...,1 | {z }
1 or more
, 0,...,0 | {z }
0 or more
)Æ(¸a(va))({G}£E).
Therefore conditions (a) and (b) hold for assuming E in V if and only if they hold for
assuming {G}£E in VG. Furthermore, Lemma E.1 implies that for every Borel F µ Sb £
V b
G, F Æ E \U 6Æ? for some open U µ Sb £V b
G if and only if {G}£F ÆW \({G}£E) 6Æ?
for some open W µ ££Sb £V b. So condition (c) for assuming E in V is equivalent to
condition (c) for assuming {G}£E in VG.
Proof of (ii). It is quite trivial that sa maximizes LEU with respect to ¸a(va) if and
only if sa maximizes LEU with respect to ¸a
G(va). ¸a
G(va) has full support in Sb £V b
G if
and only if va assumes Sb £V b
G in VG. By (i), this holds if and only if ¸a(va) assumes
K b(G)Æ{G}£Sb £V b
G in V. This proves (ii).
Proof of (iii). The base case is handled by (ii). Assume the induction hypothesis for
M È1:
8m · M, Ra
m(G)Æ{G}£Ra
m(G,VG)
By (i) and (ii), for all va 2 projV a Ra
1(G) Æ projV a
G Ra
1(G,VG), va assumes {G}£Rb
M(G,VG)
in V if and only if va assumes Rb























F PROOF OF THEOREM 3.25
To prove Theorem 3.25, we will ﬁrst show that it is a consequence of Theorem F.1 below.
The proof of Theorem F.1 is much longer, and is given in the next section.
Fix the ﬁnite strategy sets (Sa,Sb). Recall from Section 3.4 that we identify a game
G with strategy sets (Sa,Sb) with the N-tuple of real numbers that represents the pair
(¼a,¼b) of payoff functions, where N Æ 2¢jSa £Sbj. Therefore, we let the space of all
games on (Sa,Sb) be £ Æ RN. We maintain this deﬁnition of £ throughout this paper.
Theorem F.1 says there is a “Borel family” of type structures TG indexed by G 2 £ such
that each TG has RCAR forG.
39Given Polish spaces X,Y,Z and a Borel function f : X £Y ! Z, we let fy : X ! Z be
the Borel function deﬁned by fy(x)Æ f (x,y).
Theorem F.1. Let T a,T b be uncountable Polish spaces. There exist Borel maps
·a :T a ££!L(Sb £T b), ·b :T b ££!L(Sa £T a)






is a complete one-to-one lexico-






This result would follow immediately from Theorems 3.2 and 3.4 if we only required
that the map ·a
G is Borel in ta for each ﬁxed G, and similarly for b. The extra difﬁculty
lies in ﬁnding maps ·a and ·b that are Borel in both variables. Intuitively, {TG :G 2£}
is a Borel family of type structures indexed by G 2 £. Ann’s beliefs depend on both the
gameG and a type ta, and Bob’s beliefs depend on both a gameG and a type tb.
To prepare for the proof of Theorem 3.25, we ﬁrst prove an easier intermediate re-
sult, in which the requirement that V is complete is omitted. Theorem 3.25 can then be
proved by carefully embedding this V into a complete type structure so that, for each
game G 2 £, the set of states in which there is common knowledge of G remains unal-
tered.




, such that for every gameG 2£,
(i) V admits common knowledge ofG;







(iii) Any pair of types (va,vb) that believesG has common belief ofG.
Proof of Theorem F.2 from Theorem F.1. Let Sa,Sb,T a,T b,·a,·b be as they were in The-




has the required properties. The plan will be to make
T a £{G} be the set of types that have common belief ofG.
Deﬁne the function
®b :L(Sb £T b)££!L(££Sb £V b)
40asfollows. Foreach(¾,G)2L(Sb£T b)££, let®b(¾,G)betheunique¹2L(££Sb£V b)
such that
. ¹({G}£Sb £(T b £{G}))Æ~ 1; and
. For each Borel set E µSb £T b, ¹({G}£E £{G})Æ¾(E).
Note that E £{G}µSb £V b, so {G}£E £{G}µ££Sb £V b.
Claim. ®b is a continuous map.
ProofofClaim: Suppose ¾n !¾ in L(Sb£T b), andGn !G in £, where ! indicates
weak convergence. We must prove that ®b(¾n,Gn) ! ®b(¾,G). It sufﬁces to prove this
in the case that each ¾n and ¾ have length one, because it would then follow that each
coordinate of ®b(¾n,Gn) converges to the corresponding coordinate of ®b(¾,G).
Let ¯ : £ ! M(£) be the map H 7! ±H, where ±H({H}) Æ 1. We have ¯(Gn) ! ¯(G),
because for every continuous f : £ ! R,
R
f d±Gn Æ f (Gn) converges to
R
f d±G Æ f (G).
We note that
®b(¾n,Gn)Æ¯(Gn)­¾n ­¯(Gn), ®b(¾,G)Æ¯(G)­¾­¯(G).
Therefore, we have ®b(¾n,Gn)!®b(¾,G), which proves the claim.
Now, deﬁne ¸a(ta,G) Æ ®b(·a(ta,G),G). Since ·a is Borel and ®b is continuous, ¸a
is a Borel map, and hence V is a type structure with nature. Let G 2 £. We see from
the deﬁnition of ¸a that a type va 2 V a believes G if and only if va Æ (ta,G) for some
ta 2 T a. Thus Ca
1(G) Æ T a £{G}. Moreover, Ca
2(G) Æ Ca
1(G), and hence by induction,
Ca
m(G) Æ Ca
1(G). Therefore, V has the property that Ca
1(G) Æ Ca
1(G) Æ V a
G , that is, every
va thatbelievesG has common belief ofG. Itfollows thatV admits common knowledge
of G. Finally, the mappings ta 7! (ta,G),tb 7! (tb,G) are topological homeomorphisms
from T a to V a
G and T b to V b
G that give an isomorphism from the type structure TG of
Theorem F.1 to VG. Therefore, VG has the same properties as TG. In particular, VG is






Proof of Theorem 3.25 from Theorem F.1. Let Sa,Sb,T a,T b,·a,·b be as in Theorem F.1.
Let V a be the topological union
V a Æ[0,1)]([1,1)££)](T a ££),
where the three parts of the union are disjoint and clopen in V a. Note that V a Æ [0,1)]




has the required properties.
41For each G 2 £, our plan will be to let T a £{G} be the set of types having common
belief of G; let [m,m Å1)£{G} be the set of types having m-th order, but not (m Å1)-th
order, belief of G; and let [0,1) be the set of types not having belief of G. We will use the
Borel Isomorphism Theorem (Proposition C.5), as we did in the proof of Theorem 3.13.
For each m È 0, let T a
m Æ [m,1)]T a. Then T a
1 ¶ T a




cording to our plan, T a
m£{G} will be the set of types having m-th order belief ofG. These
types will be mapped to the beliefs in set Jb














m(G) is the set of LPS’s that have m-th order belief ofG. We also write
Jb





Now, let ®b :L(Sb £T b)££!L(££Sb £V b) be as in the proof of Theorem F.2. We
will construct a one-to-one Borel function ¸a :V a !L(££Sb £V b) such that
(I) ¸a([0,1))Æ Jb
0;
(II) For each m È1 andG 2£, ¸a(T a
m £{G})Æ Jb
m(G); and
(III) For eachG 2£ and ta 2T a, ¸a(ta,G)Æ®b(·a(ta,G),G).
Note that (I) and (II) imply that the map ¸a is onto. Since ¸a will be one-to-one, (I)




It is clear that the set Jb
0 has the cardinality of the continuum. We show that Jb
0 is also
Borel. To see this, let
°b :L(Sb £V b)££!L(££Sb £V b)
be the function such that °b(¾,G) is the unique ¹2L(££Sb£V b) such that ¹({G}£Sb£
V b)Æ~ 1 and for each Borel set E µSb £V b, ¹({G}£E)Æ¾(E). Note that
8G 2£, °b(L(Sb £V b)£{G})Æ Jb
1(G)
Therefore, the range of °b is
S
G2£ Jb
1(G) and the complement of the range of °b is Jb
0.
Arguing as in the proof of the Claim in Theorem F.2, we see that °b is a continuous
map. It is also clear that °b is one-to-one. By Corollary 15.2 in Kechris (1995), images
of Borels sets under such maps are Borel sets themselves. Therefore, for every Borel
F µ L(Sb £V b)££, °b(F) is Borel. In particular, the range of °b is Borel, and therefore
its complement Jb
0 is Borel.
42By the Borel Isomorphism Theorem, there is a one-to-one and onto Borel map ¸a
0 :
[0,1) ! Jb
0. This will take care of (I) since we will eventually let ¸a coincide with ¸a
0 on
[0,1).
For each G 2 £ and each m È 0, the difference Jb
m(G)\ Jb
mÅ1(G) clearly has the car-
dinality of the continuum. Moreover, since Jb
m(G) is the image under °b of a Borel set,
Jb
m(G) is Borel. Hence the difference sets Jb
m(G)\ Jb
mÅ1(G) are Borel as well. By the Borel
Isomorphism Theorem, there is a one-to-one Borel function from [m,mÅ1)£{G} onto
this difference. However, since there are uncountably many G’s, we cannot in general
glue these functions together into a single Borel function.
To get around this problem, we introduce mappings that translate the games and
keep everything else unchanged. Let G0 be the particular game whose payoff functions
are everywhere zero. Given two games G,H 2 £, let G Å H be the game obtained by
adding the payoff functions of G and H pointwise at each strategy proﬁle. Note that
G0ÅH Æ H for each H 2 £. For each H 2 £, the map G 7!G ÅH is a homeomorphism
from £ to itself that sendsG0 to H.
For H 2£, let Ãa






(ta,G ÅH) if r Æ(ta,G)2T a
1 ££;
r if r 2[0,1).
Then Ãa






H(va) is a continuous map from V a ££ onto V a.
LetÁb
H beafunctionfromL(££Sb£V b)toitselfsuchthatforeach¾2L(££Sb£V b)



















m :[m,mÅ1)££!L(££Sb £V b)
be the mapping given by ¸a
m(r,H)ÆÁb
H(½m(¾,G0)). It follows that ¸a
m is one-to-one and






1 :T a ££!L(££Sb £V b) be the mapping given by
¸a
1(ta,G)Æ®b(·a(ta,G),G).
It is clear that ¸a
1 is one-to-one. Since ®a is continuous and ·a is Borel, ¸a
1 is Borel.












1 is a one-to-one Borel mapping from
V a ontoL(££Sb£V b)thatsatisﬁes(I)–(III).ThereforeVisacompleteone-to-onetype
structure with nature.
It follows from (II) that for each H 2 £, Ca
1(H) Æ T a
1 £{H}. We then see by induction
that for each m È 0 and H 2 £, Ca
m(H) Æ T a
m £{H}. Therefore, the set of va 2 V a with







m £{H}ÆT a £{H}.
So V admits common knowledge of every game H 2 £. As in the proof of Theorem F.2,
for each G 2 £, the type structure VG is isomorphic to TG. Therefore VG is a complete












G PROOF OF THEOREM F.1
Note that each of the objects Pa
m, O(º), Xa
m deﬁned in Section 3.2 depends on a game
G 2£. In this section, we will let Pa
m(G), O(G,º), Xa
m(G) denote these objects to indicate
the dependence onG.










1(G,T) are nonempty. Our task will be to choose such maps
¸a
G, ¸b
G for each G 2 £ so that (G,ua) 7! ¸a
G(ua) is a Borel map from ££T a into L(Sb £
44T b), and similarly with a and b reversed. If the set of games £ were countable, then we
coulddirectlyappealtotheBorelIsomorphismTheoremandgluethemaps¸G together.
However, we will need to choose the maps ¸G more carefully since £ is uncountable.
The following lemma improves Theorem 3.2 by specifying in advance the length of
¸a(ta) for each type ta 2T a. For the remainder of this section, let M ÆjSajÅjSbj.










becountablepartitionsofT a,T b. ForeachgameG 2£,thereexistsacompleteone-to-one
lexicographic type structure TÆ
­
Sa,Sb,T a,T b,¸a,¸b®






and for each k È0, ta 2T a
k , tb 2T b
k , ¸a(ta) and ¸b(tb) have length k.
Proof of Lemma G.1. The proof is a routine modiﬁcation of the proofs of Lemma 3.15
and Theorem 3.13 so that for each k È0, types in T a
k are mapped to LPS’s of length k. By
the method of Lemma 3.15, one can build a family of sets
{Qa
m :m È0}, {Qb
m :m È0}
such that (i)–(vi) of Theorem 3.13 hold within T a
k for each k ¸ min(m,M). That is, we







is a decreasing chain of Borel subsets of T a
k ;
















(v) If X a 2Xa





is uncountable, and if m Ç M then ¡a(X a,Qa
mÅ1) is not even dense in ¡a(X a,Qa
m);
(vi) If X a 2Xa
1 and n ¸ M then ¡a(X a,Qa
1)\X a
n is uncountable;
Condition (v) is upgraded to insure that for k · M, no LPS in L(Sb £T b) of length k can
assume all of Qa
0,...,Qa
k. Then each piece of T a
k will have the same cardinality of the
corresponding piece of Lk(Sb£T b). The Borel Isomorphism Theorem can now be used
as in the proof of Theorem 3.13 to construct the required mappings ¸a and ¸b.











m(H) for each m.
The next lemma shows that the sequences Sa
m(G) and Xa
m(G) stabilize at M Æ jSajÅ
jSbj, and hence there are only ﬁnitely many possible shapes of games in £.















Hence there are only ﬁnitely many shapes of games in £.




mÅ1(G), then we see





n(G) for all n ¸m. More-
over, Sa
0(G) Æ Sa and Sb
0(G) Æ Sb, and the sets Sa
m(G),Sb
m(G) decrease with m. Therefore,
the pair of sets (Sa
m(G),Sb
m(G)) can change at most M times, and (i) follows.
Proof of (ii). Let m È M and X a 2Xa
m(G). Then X a ÆO(G,¹) for some ¹2Pa
m(G). We
have ¹Æºº0 for some º2N (Sb) with Supp(º)ÆSb




m¡1(G), so ¹0 Æº¹2Pa
m(G). It is clear that O(G,¹0)ÆO(G,¹), so X a 2Xa
mÅ1(G).
This proves (ii).
Lemma G.2 shows that the shape ofG depends only on Xa
m(G),Xb
m(G) for m · M Å1.











m Æ1,...,MÅ1. And we say that S is a gameshape if there exists a gameG 2£ such that
SÆS(G).
The intuitive idea of our proof of Theorem F.1 will be to build the type structures
TG in such a way that they can be glued together by an inductive construction on the
length of LPS’s. For each ﬁxed length k È 0, we will see that the set £ of games can be
partitioned into ﬁnitely many classes such that within each class, the length k parts of
the type structures TG can be chosen to be the same up to a Borel transformation, and
thus can be combined into a single type structure.
To do this, we will need some results from the literature about deﬁnable sets in the
ordered ﬁeld of real numbers. We let FÆhR,0,1,Å,¢,Çi be the ordered ﬁeld of real num-
bers. A set of n-tuples A µ Rn is said to be deﬁnable (in F) if A is the set of all n-tuples
that satisfy a ﬁrst order formula '(x1,...,xn,~ c) in F that has the variables x0,...,xn and a
46ﬁnitetuple~ c ofparametersinR. Giventwodeﬁnablesets A µRm,B µRn inF, afunction
f :B ! A is said to be deﬁnable (in F) if its graph
©
(~ x,~ y): f (~ x)Æ~ y
ª
is deﬁnable.
The celebrated classical result of Tarski (1951) shows that a set is deﬁnable in F if and
only if it is semi-algebraic (i.e., deﬁnable by ﬁnite collections of equations and inequali-
ties between polynomials). Tarski’s theorem has the following easy consequence.
Proposition G.3.
(i) F is o-minimal, that is, every set A µ R that is deﬁnable in F is the union of ﬁnitely
many open intervals and singletons.
(ii) Every set A µRk that is deﬁnable in F is Borel.
We refer to the monograph van den Dries (1998) for an exposition of o-minimal
structures, but we will only need the particular o-minimal structure F. We will need a
result of Hardt (1980), which says that every deﬁnable function can be partitioned into
ﬁnitely many deﬁnable pieces that each look like the projection of a product of two sets
ontooneofthefactors. Thisresultwasgeneralizedtoo-minimalstructures(seevanden
Dries, 1998, chap. 9, Theorem 1.2).
Deﬁnition G.4. Suppose A µ Rm,B µ Rn, g : B ! A is deﬁnable, and g maps B onto A.
We say that g is deﬁnablytrivial if there exists a deﬁnable setC µRk for some k and a de-
ﬁnable function h :B !C such that the function (g,h):B ! A£C is a homeomorphism.
PropositionG.5(Hardt(1980)). Let A µRm,B µRn, and g :B ! A bedeﬁnable, andsup-




of A into deﬁnable
sets such that for each i · p, the restriction of g to g¡1(Ai) is deﬁnably trivial.
Intheaboveproposition, notethatforeachi, thesetBi Æ g¡1(Ai)andtherestriction
gi of g to Bi are also deﬁnable. The result says that there is a deﬁnable set Ci and a
deﬁnable function hi :Bi !Ci such that (gi,hi):Bi ! Ai £Ci is a homeomorphism, i.e.,
one-to-one, onto, and bi-continuous.
We now look at deﬁnable properties of games and tuples of probability measures.
Recall that M(Sb) is the set of all probability measures on Sb. We may identify a prob-
ability measure º 2 M(Sb) with the real vector hº(sb) : sb 2 Sbi 2 RjSbj and note that this
tuple satisﬁes the ﬁrst order formulas 0 · º(sb) · 1 and
P
sb2Sb º(sb) Æ 1. Similarly, for
each ﬁxed k, the k-tuple of probability measures º 2 Nk(Sb) is identiﬁed with a k ¢jSbj-
tuple of reals in the obvious way.
47By a k-fold support in Sb we mean a k-tuple Y Æ (Y0,...,Yk¡1) of nonempty sets
Yi µSb such that
S
jÇk Yj ÆSb. The k-fold support of a k-tuple
ºÆ(º0,...,ºk¡1)2Nk(Sb)





The next lemma shows that for each ﬁxed k, certain relations involving games and
k-tuples of probability measures on Sb are deﬁnable.
Lemma G.6. For each k, the following sets are deﬁnable.























, the set {G 2£:S(G)ÆS}.
Proof of Lemma G.6. Proof of (i–iii). These can be seen by writing the deﬁnitions for-
mally in ﬁrst order logic.
Proof of (iv). By Lemma B.4, for each n and each set X a µSa, we have X a 2Xa
n(G) if
and only if there exists an º2NMÅ1(Sb)\Pa
n(G) such that O(G,º)Æ X a. The point is that
we need only consider º’s of length M Å1. The result now follows from (i) and (iii).




of £ such that
for each i · p,
(i) Ai is deﬁnable;
(ii) 9Si8G 2 Ai, S(G)ÆSi, i.e., all the games in Ai have the same shape;
(iii) For each set X µ Sa and each k-fold support Y in Sb, the projection function from
the set
Bi,X,Y Æ{(G,º)2 Ai £Nk(Sb):O(G,º)Æ X ^Y ÆSuppk(º)}
to Ai is deﬁnably trivial.
Remark G.8. For each k-good partition of £, the family of sets
{Bi,X,Y :i · p ^X µSa ^Y ÆSuppk(º)}
indexed by (i,X,Y ) in (iii) is a ﬁnite partition of ££Nk(Sb) into deﬁnable sets. The set





is a k-good partition of £. Let i · p;Gi 2 Ai, X µSa; Y




.24 Thenthereisadeﬁnablefunctionh :Bi,X,Y !Ci,X,Y such
that the function (g,h):Bi,X,Y ! Ai £Ci,X,Y is a homeomorphism.
Proof of Lemma G.9. By (iii) in Deﬁnition G.7, the projection function g from Bi,X,Y to
Ai is deﬁnably trivial, so there is a set D and a deﬁnable function f : Bi,X,Y ! D such
that the function (g, f ) : Bi,X,Y ! Ai £D is a homeomorphism. Then the restriction of
f to {Gi}£Ci,X,Y is a homeomorphism from {Gi}£Ci,X,Y to D. Therefore, there is a
deﬁnable homeomorphism ` from D toCi,X,Y , and hence the composition h Æ`± f has
the required properties.
Proposition G.5 gives us the following lemma about game-LPS pairs.
Lemma G.10. For each k È0, there exists a k-good partition of £.
Proof of Lemma G.10. By Lemma G.6, for each game shape S and k È0, the sets
AS Æ{G 2£:S(G)ÆS}, BS Æ AS£Nk(Sb)
are deﬁnable. It sufﬁces to prove that for each game shape S, the set AS admits a ﬁnite




such that (iii) holds for each i · p. If so then
the union of these partitions will be a k-good partition of £.
Now ﬁx a game shape S, and let g be the projection function from BS onto AS. Since
the sets Sa and Sb are ﬁnite, there are only ﬁnitely many (X,Y ) such that X µ Sa and Y
is a k-fold support in Sb. For such (X,Y ), let
BX,Y Æ
©
(G,º)2BS :O(G,º)Æ X and Suppk(º)ÆY
ª
.
ByLemmaG.6, eachsetBX,Y isdeﬁnable, andhencetherestrictionof g toBX,Y isdeﬁn-




of AS into deﬁn-
able sets such that for each j · q, the restriction of g to (g¡1(Aj,X,Y ))\BX,Y is deﬁnably
trivial. Let us say that two gamesG,H 2 A are equivalent if
©




(j,X,Y ): H 2 Aj,X,Y
ª
.
There are ﬁnitely many equivalence classes in AS and each equivalence class is deﬁn-





and this partition satisﬁes (iii) as required.
We are now ready to prove Theorem F.1.
24i.e.,Ci,X,Y is the ﬁber in Bi,X,Y aboveGi with respect to g.
49Proof of Theorem F.1. We will construct a pair of Borel functions
·a :££T a !L(Sb £T b), ·b :££T b !L(Sa £T a)
with the required properties in several steps. Steps 3 and 5 will require additional proof.










of T a and T b into continuum-
large Borel sets so that T a Æ
U
kÈ0T a








of £ for each
k. Recall that for all i, games in Ai,k have the same shape.
3. Next, for each (i,k), we construct a Borel map ·a : Ai,k £T a
k ! Lk(Sb £T b) such
that for all G 2 Ai,k, ·a(G,T a
k ) Æ Lk(Sb £T b). We will subdivide the domain even
further in this step.
4. Byjoiningsuchmapsforalli · p(k), wewillgetaBorelmap·a :££T a
k !Lk(Sb£
T b) since p(k) is ﬁnite. Finally, we will join such maps for all k 2 N, to get a Borel
map ·a :££T a !L(Sb £T b).
5. Lastly, we will verify that ·a and ·b satisfy the desired properties.




of £, and i · p(k).













and for each j È0, ta 2T a
j , tb 2T b
j , ¸a
G(ta) and ¸b
G(tb) have length j.
Ifwecouldgluetogetherthemap¸a
G foreachG 2 Ai,k todeﬁneaBorelmap(G,ta)7!
¸G(ta) then we would be done. However, there are uncountably many G’s in Ai,k, so we
cannot appeal to the Borel Isomorphism Theorem.
In order to get around this problem, we ﬁx some Gi,k 2 Ai,k and the associated type





Gi,k. We will soon show that the structural properties shared by
the games in Ai,k allow us to deﬁne a Borel map ·a on Ai,k £T a
k from the mapping ¸a
i,k
so that ·a has the desired properties.
For each X µSa and each k-fold support Y in Sb, let
Bi,X,Y,k Æ
n















50Note that the sets Bi,X,Y,k andCi,X,Y,k are deﬁnable. By Proposition G.3, Bi,X,Y,k is Borel,
and hence Di,X,Y,k µT a
k is Borel as well. We note that for each i · p(k), the family of sets
n
Di,X,Y,k : X µSa and Y is a k-fold support in Sb
o
is a partition of T a
k into ﬁnitely many Borel sets, some of which may be empty.
We will deﬁne the restriction of ·a to Ai,k £Di,X,Y,k. We ﬁx X µSa, and a k-fold sup-
port Y in Sb. Let g be the projection function from Bi,X,Y,k to Ai,k. By Lemma G.9, there
is a deﬁnable function h : Bi,X,Y,k ! Ci,X,Y,k such that the function (g,h) : Bi,X,Y,k !
Ai,k £Ci,X,Y,k is a homeomorphism.
Since Y is a k-fold support in Sb, we can write Y Æ (Y0,...,Yk¡1). Now, let LY Æ
©






. Let ÁY :
LY £MY ! LY be the function that maps (¹,º) to ÁY (¹,º) such that the j-th compo-




¹j(E j{sb}£T b)¢ºj(sb) for each Borel set E µSb £T b.
That is, ÁY (¹,º) is the measure such that its marginal on Sb is equal to º; and for each
sb 2Yj, its beliefs conditional on
©
sbª
£T b is the same as those of ¹. It is clear that ÁY is
Borel and that ¹ and ÁY (¹,º) have idential null sets. Furthermore, ÁY (¹,¢) is a one-to-












We deﬁne ·a : Ai,k £Di,X,Y,k ! Lk(Sb £T b) as the following composition of Borel










Therefore ·a is Borel. We also let ·a
G(ta) Æ ·a(G,ta). ·a(G,ta) has marginal beliefs such
that X is the optimal set under it in gameG; and it also has the same null sets as ¸a
i,k(ta)
at every level.26 An important implication of this is that ·a
G(ta) 2 L Å(Sb £T b) ()
¸a
i,k(ta)2L Å(Sb £T b) and they assume the same events at each level.
Claim. For eachG 2 Ai,k, ·a
G is a one-to-one map.
Proof of claim. Let ta,r a 2 Di,X,Y,k, and ta 6Æ r a. Now, consider the case when
margSb ¸a
i,k(ta) 6Æ margSb ¸a
i,k(r a). Then margSb ·a
G(ta) 6Æ margSb ·a
G(r a) since it is clear
25ÁY (¢,º) is not one-to-one.
26In comparison, ¸a
i,k(ta) has marginal beliefs such that X is the optimal set under it in gameGi,k.




is one-to-one from the properties of (g,h). There-
fore, ·a
G(ta) 6Æ ·a
G(r a). Now, consider the case when margSb ¸a




G(r a) then ¸a
i,k(ta) and ¸a




£T b for each sb 2 Sb. However, if that is so, then margSb ¸a
i,k(ta) Æ
margSb ¸a
i,k(r a) Æ) ¸a
i,k(ta)Æ¸a









Proof of claim. This follows immediately from the previous two claims.




k into Lk(Sb £T b). Since each of the functions ¸a
i,k maps T a
k onto Lk(Sb £T b), ·a
G
maps to T a
k onto Lk(Sb £T b) for each G 2 Ai,k. Moreover, since the sets X and Y can
be recovered from each gameG and LPS ¾2Lk(Sb £T b), and ·a
G is one-to-one on each
Di,X,Y,k, it follows that ·a
G is one-to-one on T a
k .
We now deﬁne the full function ·a on ££T a by taking the union of the pieces we
have deﬁned on each ££T a
k . Since the sets T a
k are disjoint Borel sets, this union is a
Borel functionfrom ££T a onto L(Sb£T b), and for each g 2£, ·a
G is aone-to-one Borel







a complete one-to-one type structure.






We do this by proving two claims.






Proof of claim. Let sa 2 Sa and ta 2 T a
k . For some X,Y we have ta 2 Di,X,Y,k. Then









k (Sb £T b);
(sa,ta)2Ra
1(G,TG).






Proof of claim. We prove the result for a and b together by induction on m. The
52case m Æ 1 is proved in the preceding claim. We suppose the claim holds for m with b













This proves our claim.
Now, take k ¸ M Å1 and let G 2 £. Then G 2 Ai,k for some i · p(k). We chose the
typestructureUi,k sothatRa
1(Gi,k,Ui,k)\(Sa£T a
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